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THE ETHICAL LIMITS OF DISCREDITING
THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS:
HOW MODERN ETHICS RULES FAIL TO
PREVENT TRUTHFUL WITNESSES FROM
BEING DISCREDITED THROUGH
UNETHICAL MEANS
TODD A. BERGER*
Whether the criminal defense attorney may ethically discredit the
truthful witness on cross-examination and later during closing argument
has long been an area of controversy in legal ethics. The vast majority of
scholarly discussion on this important ethical dilemma has examined it in
the abstract, focusing on the defense attorney’s dual roles in a criminal
justice system that is dedicated to searching for the truth while
simultaneously requiring zealous advocacy even for the guiltiest of
defendants. Unlike these previous works, this particular Article explores
this dilemma from the perspective of the techniques that criminal defense
attorney’s use on cross-examination and closing argument to cast doubt
on the testimony of a credible witness. It shows that, while it is ethically
permissible to discredit the truthful witness, it is not uncommon for
criminal defense attorneys to do so through unethical means. Further,
absent voluntary compliance, current ethics rules cannot adequately
prevent this type of professional misbehavior. Thus, a change in the
culture of criminal defense lawyering is necessary to ensure that criminal
* Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. This Article originally began
as a presentation given at the 2013 Applied Legal Storytelling Conference in London,
England. In the course of turning that presentation into the current Article, many thanks are
in order. The author would like to thank the many members of the Syracuse University
College of Law Faculty Workshops (there are simply too many to name) who provided
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defense attorneys recognize the value of increased compliance with the
ethical dictates that govern the practice of law.
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INTRODUCTION

Whether it is ethical to present a “false defense”1 by discrediting a
truthful witness on cross-examination and later during closing argument
has been an area of great focus in modern legal ethics.2 This Article
explores the most common forms of cross-examination and closing
argument that criminal defense attorneys use to accomplish this task.
This work posits that, pursuant to current ethics guidelines, there are
both ethical and unethical techniques that can be used to advance a false
defense by discrediting the truthful witness.
While it is ethically permissible to discredit the truthful witness,3
current ethics rules place reasonable constraints on the types of crossexaminations and closing arguments that can be used to make the
truthful witness appear unworthy of belief.4 Despite this fact, it is a
commonplace occurrence in America’s criminal courtrooms for truthful
witnesses to be discredited not through ethical means, but instead
1. A “false defense” is defined as a trial theory in which defense counsel attempts “to
convince the judge or jury that facts established by the state and known to the attorney to be
true are not true, or that facts known by the attorney to be false are true.” Harry I. Subin,
The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case,
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987).
2. Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful Witness:
Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2000)
(This question is the subject of fascinating commentary and thoughtful debate in professional
literature”). “Whether it is ethically permissible to suggest that a truthful witness is lying
during cross-examination has been famously characterized as one of the ‘three hardest
questions’” in terms of the ethical dilemmas faced in the practice of law. Id. (quoting Monroe
H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966)).
3. See Subin, supra note 1, at 126.
4. Id.
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through the use of unethical techniques that largely ignore the
reasonable limits placed on the types of cross-examinations and closing
arguments that can be used to make the true look false.5 The reason for
this is simple: the use of unethical forms of cross-examination and
closing argument are the most effective from a trial advocacy
perspective.
Further, in noting the ethical boundaries of the common techniques
that are used to discredit truthful witnesses, it becomes clear that, absent
voluntary compliance, current ethics rules are largely unable to prevent
criminal defense attorneys from adopting these unethical forms of trial
advocacy.6 It is also unlikely that ethics rules will be amended to ensure
that those who adopt unethical forms of cross-examination and closing
argument will be revealed.7
As a result, the culture of criminal defense lawyering must change to
ensure that criminal defense attorneys recognize that ethics rules that
allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited, while placing reasonable
limits on the types of cross-examination and closing arguments that are
used to this effect, represent a fair and commendable balance between
zealous advocacy of even the guiltiest defendants and that the
corresponding search for the truth that is at the center of a criminal
trial.8 This change in the culture of criminal defense lawyering and a
recognition of the value of these rules is an essential component of
ensuring voluntary compliance with these largely unenforceable, ethical
dictates in the context of making the true look false and the false look
true.
This work leaves for another day a discussion concerning how this
particular change in the culture of criminal defense lawyering can be
brought about. Instead, this Article is limited to identifying the problem
at hand, i.e., the frequency with which unethical techniques are used to
discredit honest witnesses when advancing a false theory of defense and
5. See infra Part III.B, IV.
6. Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to
Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 795 (2004).
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. This Article addresses these competing values in greater detail in infra Part III.C.2.
However, the lawyer’s dilemma in serving these competing ideals is perhaps best summed up
by Professor Peter J. Henning who observes, “Lawyers must deal with a conundrum because
they are required to act as officers of the court—presumably working to advance the truth—
while providing loyal representation to clients who may have little to gain from its
ascertainment, particularly in criminal cases.” Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty
in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 211 (2006).
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the inability of contemporary ethics rules to police this type of
misbehavior. In this sense, this work is intended as an important first
step in bringing about the more ethical practice of law in this unique
context.
This work proceeds in three parts. Part II explains why criminal
defense attorneys discredit truthful witnesses and provides an overview
of the current scholarly literature addressing this topic. Part III
demonstrates an applied approach to understanding the ethical limits of
discrediting the truthful witness and provides a normative critique of
current ethics rules that regulate this type of attorney conduct. Part IV
explains why trial attorneys frequently choose unethical techniques to
advance a false theory of defense and explores the difficulty that exists
in curbing this type of unethical behavior.
II. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL
WITNESS
A. Why Lawyers Discredit Truthful Witnesses
In a criminal case, choosing a theory of defense is generally
considered a matter of trial tactics and strategy.9 It has become an
accepted part of trial practice to view the selection of a particular theory
of defense as the primary responsibility of defense counsel, subject to
consultation with his10 client.11
Sometimes the theory of defense may be based on the client’s
exculpatory account of “what really happened.”12 However, sometimes
a client admits to his attorney that he is guilty of the crime, and the
9. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1660 (2000)
(“Initially, the decision regarding whether to explore an avenue of defense and how to
present it is largely a matter of tactics or strategy.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999)).
10. A fact pattern is used throughout this Article that is partially based on an actual
criminal trial. In that trial the defendant was a male. Therefore, the pronoun “he” is used
throughout this work for the purposes of literary consistency only.
11. This traditional view was perhaps best articulated by the Supreme Court of
Colorado in Steward v. People, 498 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo. 1972) (holding that it was the defense
lawyer who made the decisions in his role as “captain of the ship” as to what evidence to offer
and what strategy to employ in the presentation of the defense). For a more detailed
discussion concerning this area of trial practice, see generally Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Joshua
Allen, WHO DECIDES: The Allocation of Powers Between the Lawyer and the Client in a
Criminal Case?, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2002, at 28.
12. See infra note 53.
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defendant wants to challenge the state’s case without testifying, despite
the fact that the state’s evidence is legally sufficient to establish each
element of the crime.13 To that end, one legal expert posed the
following question, “What should a criminal defense lawyer do when the
lawyer is certain that the client is factually guilty (usually because the
client has confessed to the lawyer), but the client nevertheless insists on
a strong defense? This situation may be the defense lawyer’s worst
nightmare.”14
When the state’s evidence is legally sufficient to prove each element
of the crime, often times the criminal defense attorney must challenge
the weight (said another way—the quality) of the prosecution’s evidence
by discrediting the truthful witness and in the process presenting a false
defense.15 Put simply, when faced with such a predicament, the criminal
defense attorney may have no other choice but to pursue this type of
defense.
B. An Overview of Current Scholarly Literature
As noted previously, whether it is ethically permissible to discredit
the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing argument has
been a topic that has long fascinated legal scholars.16 However, rather
than discuss the specific ethical limitations placed on the types of crossexaminations and closing arguments that are used to discredit honest
witnesses, the general tenure of the existing scholarly debate has largely
focused on more abstract-oriented discussions concerning whether
society’s best interests are advanced when the criminal defense attorney
attempts to distort the truth.17
13. See Subin, supra note 1, at 146.
14. Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client Is Guilty:
Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 229, 229 (2009).
15. See Todd A. Berger, A Trial Attorney’s Dilemma: How Storytelling as a Trial
Strategy Can Impact a Criminal Defendant’s Successful Appellate Review, 4 DREXEL L. REV.
297, 302–06 (2012). When challenging the weight of the evidence, the defendant has
conceded that the evidence is sufficient in the abstract to make out each element of the crime
charged. Id. 304–05. In this sense, the defendant has acknowledged the state has presented a
sufficient quantity of evidence to justify a conviction. Id. A review based upon a sufficiencyof-the-evidence claim examines the quantity of evidence presented by the prosecution and
determines whether the prosecution has presented enough evidence to make out each
element of the crime or crimes charged. Id. at 302. However, a challenge to the weight of the
prosecution’s evidence is not a challenge to its quantity, but rather its quality. Id. at 304–05.
16. See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1055; see also Freedman, supra note 2.
17. See John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to

2015]

DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS

289

In this regard, some scholars have posited that defense counsel
should “do anything within the bounds of the law” in representing his
client, regardless of the client’s guilt or innocence.18 In embracing this
type of advocacy, Professor John B. Mitchell argues that the goal of the
criminal defense attorney is not to seek the truth but to ensure that the
criminal defendant is not convicted unless the state can present proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.19 Therefore, according to Mitchell, it is
ethically permissible for a criminal defense attorney to present the jury
with alternative possibilities that counsel knows to be false, as doing so
has the net effect of protecting the factually innocent and acting as a
check on the government’s power.20 Mitchell’s argument has been
referred to as a “systemic justification” for presenting a false defense.21
Other scholars contend that the criminal defense attorney should
advance a false defense and attempt to make the truthful witness look
untruthful based on what has been termed “the ‘client-centered’
justification for zealous advocacy.”22 These scholars argue that this form
of zealous advocacy is necessary to advance client dignity and
autonomy.23
Professor Subin’s Position on Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 339, 339 (1987) (asserting that whether an attorney should discredit a truthful witness
is “a difficult issue which touches upon the very nature of our criminal justice system, the role
of the attorney in that system, the relationship of the individual to the state, and the
Constitution”).
18. Suni, supra note 9, at 1649 (observing that some theorists argue that “defense
counsel can, and perhaps must, do anything within the bounds of the law to represent their
clients, regardless of innocence or guilt and regardless of the effect on third persons or
truth”).
19. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 340–41.
20. Id. at 342–44. Mitchell posits that “the criminal justice system protects the
individual from the police power of the executive branch” and that requiring the government
to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential component of protecting
individual rights. Id. at 342. In this sense, Mitchell maintains that defense counsel can put
forth what he terms a “pure reasonable doubt defense” in which counsel presents the jury
with alternative possibilities that counsel knows are false, without asserting the truth of those
alternatives. Id. at 343–44.
21. See Suni, supra note 9, at 1651.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 13, 26–27
(1990). Freedman’s basic premise is that the American adversarial legal system is rooted in
the Bill of Rights and exists principally to affirm the human dignity of each individual. Id.
Freedman believes that it is necessary for the criminal defense attorney to advance a false
defense because doing so preserves the sanctity of lawyer-client confidentiality—the lawyer
only knows the “truth” through client confidences—which safeguards individual autonomy
and dignity. Id. at 65–86.
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Other thinkers posit that client-centered advocacy requires vigorous
discrediting of truthful witnesses because the principal obligation the
lawyer owes to his client is one of fidelity and loyalty.24 In reaching this
conclusion, some of these thinkers draw heavily on religious texts, which
they believe provide spiritual support for their position.25
However, not all scholars have so readily embraced the notion that
the defense attorney should advance a false defense by discrediting the
truthful witness. Perhaps most prominently, Professor Harry I. Subin
argues for a more limited role when defense counsel knows the
defendant is guilty, which is motivated in large part by the defense
attorney’s dual obligations as an advocate and an officer of the court.26
Subin concedes that, because the defendant has a constitutional right to
force the government to prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, it corresponds that it is likewise ethically permissible
to discredit the truthful witness in order to challenge the weight of the
government’s evidence.27

24. See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER
L. REV. 443, 519–29 (1999). In a provocative article, Professors Smith and Montross posit
that the principal duty owed to the client is the duty of fidelity and loyalty, which is derived
from biblical teachings contained in “The Prophets and The Writings.” Id. at 518–19. The
duty of fidelity in turn requires that the criminal defense attorney rigorously cross-examine a
truthful or sympathetic witness. Id. at 528–29.
25. Id. at 518–19.
26. See Subin, supra note 1, at 128. Subin proposed that criminal defense attorneys
should be prohibited from asserting defenses that they know to be false. Id. (“It is true that in
our system the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt, and the defense the
corresponding right to remain completely passive in the presentation of facts to the jury. It is
true that the defense attorney has the right, and the obligation, to challenge the government’s
proof to assure its accuracy. The question is whether it should also be the ‘duty’ of the ‘most
honorable’ defense attorney to take affirmative steps to subvert the government’s case when
he or she knows it is accurate. I shall argue that the attorney can perform his or her duty fully
even if not permitted to act in this way, and that if stricter limits on truth subversion were
instituted, the rights of persons accused of crimes generally would be enhanced.”).
27. See Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present
a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 689–90 (1988). Subin found support for this
position in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which holds that a criminal defense
attorney is entitled to “put the prosecution to its proof even if there is no nonfrivolous basis
for the defense.” Id. at 696 n.34 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 Model
Code Comparison (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)). “[A]ccording to the drafters [of the rule], it
reflects, ‘the constitutional principle that the state must prove every element of the
crime . . . .’” Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N,
Proposed Final Draft 1981)). For a more detailed exploration of the constitutional right to
discredit the truthful witness and present a false defense, see Part III.C.2.
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Nevertheless, to Subin, criminal defense lawyers have a primary
obligation to the truth, and tactics that distort or mislead the jury are
inconsistent with this obligation.28 Initially, Subin argued that when
defense counsel knows the client is guilty, in such instances, he should
be limited to a monitoring role to ensure that a conviction is based on an
adequate amount of competent and admissible evidence.29 Subin later
modified his position, based in part on the defendant’s constitutional
right to challenge the state’s case, and proposed that defense lawyers
could argue carefully worded alternative inferences or explanations that
the attorney knows are not true for the purpose of assisting the fact
finder in measuring the weight of the evidence.30 However, in Subin’s
view, the jury should be given an instruction that it is permissible for the
defense to offer alternative versions of the facts, even if it has no good
faith basis for believing the truth of its position.31 Moreover, Subin
rejects the assertion of the systemic justifications noted above, i.e., that
truth subversion in an individual case is a necessary component of
preventing governmental overreaching in the large scheme of the
criminal justice system.32
Subin’s view has been referred to as a form of “weak
adversarial[ism.]”33 Proponents of this type of lawyering suggest that it
advances societies interests because
28. See Subin, supra note 1, at 125 n.5, 149 (arguing that “a fundamental goal” of the
criminal justice system “is determining the truth” and that when the truth is subverted, the
justice system is properly considered a “victim”).
29. Id. at 146. Subin argues:
Unless we abandon completely the notion that verdicts should be based upon the
truth, we must accept the fact that there may simply be no version of the facts
favorable to the defense worthy of assertion in a court. In such cases, the role of the
defense attorney should be limited to assuring that the state adduces sufficient
legally competent evidence to sustain its burden of proof.
Id. (footnote omitted).
30. Subin, supra note 27, at 689–90. Subin modified his position partly because he had
come to believe his earlier monitor role formulation was unworkable. Id. However, in
modifying his position, he also noted that defense counsel could suggest alternative
explanations to test the weight of the government’s evidence based on the constitutional
principle that the defendant had the right to force the government to prove each element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 690.
31. Id. at 698.
32. Subin, supra note 1, at 148–49.
33. Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 14, at 245–46. In addition to Subin, other legal
theorists have also embraced a weak adversarial position. See David Luban, Partisanship,
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90
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[i]t is only when the judge and jury know the truth that society
wins. Each time the lawyer uses talents and skills to pollute the
courtroom with a lie, either explicit or implicit, the lawyer has
intentionally diminished the chances that individual justice will
be done. Thus society loses.34
As detailed above, much of the discussion relating to the ethics of
arguing a false defense by discrediting the truthful witness does not
focus on the trial advocacy techniques used to accomplish this task but
instead addresses broader policy or philosophically oriented objectives.
Indeed, thousands of pages have been written with regard to these types
of arguments and the positions of Professors Subin and Mitchell have
been prominently featured in the leading legal ethics casebooks.35
However, despite the policy-oriented focus of these discussions, other
legal commenters have rightly noted that, in the context of discrediting
the truthful witness, criminal defense attorneys “do routinely use an
arsenal of tricks to subvert the truth”36 and that, for this reason, a
significant problem in attorney ethics relates more directly to the
various techniques that defense lawyers consistently use to conceal and
distort the truth.37
When addressing the actual techniques of truth subversion, not only
have most scholars simply glossed over their application to existing
ethics rules38 but, to the extent they have addressed them at all, there

COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1018–43 (1990) (favoring a position of weak adversarialism in crossexamining truthful witnesses in rape cases); Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look
False and the False Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135, 1143 (1988) (arguing that cross-examination
should be barred when the defense lawyer knows that the witness’s testimony regarding their
self-perceived level of certainty is correct); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1710–12 (1993) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers
should not engage in any form of deception).
34. Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman’s Ethics, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 455,
464–65 (1991).
35. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 419–24 (5th ed. 1998); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 437–38 (3d ed. 1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
279–305 (2d ed. 1995); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 256–73 (1995).
36. Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin
Frankel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 619
(2005).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 636–38.
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appears to be little consistency in their conclusions.39 Professor Subin is
of the view that “[t]o the extent that these techniques of legal truthsubversion have been addressed at all, most authorities have approved
them.”40 However, Professor Subin’s conclusion is drawn in a cursory
manner, and he spends very little time engaged in any type of in-depth
analysis of actual trial techniques or ethics guidelines.41 Importantly, as
this Article thoroughly details below,42 Professor Subin’s contention is
simply not accurate. Further, Professor Mitchell, in glossing over the
trial techniques used to argue a false defense, appears to acknowledge
the existence of some ethical limitations on how false defenses are
presented.43 In this sense, he suggests, without any discussion of existing
ethical rules, that it is permissible to argue a false defense so long as the
jury is not told a falsehood (“I will not assert that facts known by me to
be true are false or those known to be false are true.”).44 Other
commenters have even less thoroughly addressed how current ethics
rules limit the means by which truthful witnesses may be discredited by
suggesting that, while it is ethically permissible to argue false inferences
from true facts to test the prosecution’s case, it is only “more
controversial” to make an explicit representation to the jury that
defense counsel knows is false.45
39. Id.
40. See Subin, supra note 1, at 127 (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.6
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1980 & Supp. 1986)).
41. Id. at 152–53.
42. See infra Part III.B.
43. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344.
44. Id.
45. Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1059–65. In addition to the above, it also worth
noting that other scholars have addressed the issue of discrediting the truthful witness but in a
manner that is less focused on the specific types of cross-examination and closing arguments
that are used to argue a false defense. In exploring the ethical limitations of a false-defense
theory from the perspective of current ethical guidelines, Professor Suni focuses on the ethics
of blaming innocent third parties for the commission of a crime. Suni, supra note 9.
However, Professor Suni’s analysis of the actual closing argument presented to the jury does
not indicate exactly how the false theory of defense was communicated. Id. Professor Steven
J. Johansen has explored the ethical limits of the false defense from the perspective of applied
legal storytelling in his essay Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?: An Essay on the Ethical
Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 63 (2010).
Professor Johansen argues that legal storytelling poses ethical challenges to lawyers in that
stories may be persuasive that are not always true. Id. at 64. However, Professor Johansen
does not explore the exact techniques that criminal defense attorneys use to advance false
defenses and notes that “stories lawyers tell must reveal their clients’ good faith beliefs.” Id.
at 65. In this regard, this Article explores the ethical limits of how criminal defense attorneys
advance false defenses that are expressly premised on the absence of a good faith belief. See
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This Article addresses this gap in scholarly literature by exploring
the limits that current ethics rules place on the actual techniques that
criminal defense attorney’s use on cross-examination and closing
argument to discredit the truthful witness.
What follows is a
46
demonstration of these techniques, an exploration of their ethical
parameters,47 and an examination of current ethics rules from a
normative point of view.48
III. AN APPLIED APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL
STATUS OF DISCREDITING TRUTHFUL WITNESSES
A. Methods for Discrediting Truthful Witnesses
1. Hypothetical Case: Commonwealth v. Cassidy
a. The Facts
To demonstrate the techniques used to discredit truthful witnesses
and the ethical challenges associated with each technique, consider the
following hypothetical case, which will be referred to as Commonwealth
v. Cassidy.49
The below facts were testified to on direct examination and are
substantially the same as the facts recounted in the police report
provided to defense counsel prior to trial:
At 7:00 p.m. on February 14, 2000, Philadelphia police
received a radio call that a man wearing a red T-shirt and blue
sweatpants was in possession of a handgun.
At 7:03 p.m., Police Officer Frank Drebin arrived at the
scene. Officer Drebin testified that he has worked in the area for
id.
46. See infra Part III.A.
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. See infra Part III.C.
49. This example has been in large part adopted from an actual trial and represents the
actual defense theory in the case. I should stress that I have no idea whether the theory that
was ultimately advanced was known by defense attorney to be false. Also, I am uncertain as
to how the actual defense theory was advanced, i.e., through the use of the ethical or
unethical means. I was not involved in the preparation in this case and participated in no
way. I was merely an observer of sorts. I have changed the names of the parties involved and
added a few rhetorical flourishes for the reader’s enjoyment. The liberties I have taken with
certain facts in no way change the conceptual framework in which this defense theory was
advanced.
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many years and knows it to be an area with a high rate of violent
crime. Illegal firearm possession is a common offense in the area
as well.
When Officer Drebin arrived on the scene, he noticed the
man, later identified as Mr. Quinton Cassidy, standing on the
sidewalk. Mr. Cassidy immediately turned away from the officer
and began to walk quickly in the opposite direction. Mr. Cassidy
was wearing black sweatpants and had on a maroon colored Tshirt. In the back of the sweatpants the officer could see the
outline of a handgun. The officer was forty-five feet away from
the defendant. The officer drew his own weapon out of a
concern for officer safety. The officer called for Mr. Cassidy to
stop. At this point, Mr. Cassidy, with his back to the officer,
reached his hand around his back and grabbed the handle of the
gun and began to turn toward the officer. The officer, fearing
that Mr. Cassidy was about to fire the weapon at him, fired his
own weapon three times. Each bullet struck Mr. Cassidy in his
leg. Mr. Cassidy was then arrested.
A firearm was recovered from the right hand of Mr. Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy’s fingerprints were on the firearm. The gun weighed
five pounds. Mr. Cassidy was arrested and charged with
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm Without a License.50
Officer Drebin was cleared by internal affairs, which
determined the shooting was justified.
No other witnesses, except Officer Drebin, were called at
trial because they could not be located by either side.
The pre-trial discovery process reveals that Officer Drebin has a
checkered past, most of which involves the questionable use of force.
The most significant incident involved the shooting of five unarmed men
in a park. Officer Drebin maintains that the shooting was justified
because he saw several men in togas stabbing another man in view of
100 people. It was later revealed that Officer Drebin merely witnessed a
50. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106(a)(1) (2008). “Firearms not to be carried without a
license” reads in relevant part,
Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle
or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his
place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license
under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
Id.
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“Shakespeare in the Park” production of Julius Caesar.51 Officer
Drebin is on employment-related probation as a result of the above
incident. He has been notified that if Internal Affairs finds one more
violation of police department policy, he will be dismissed.
Prior to trial, defense counsel interviews Mr. Cassidy. The police
report is read to him, and he is asked to tell you his version of events.
After reading the police report to Mr. Cassidy, he states, “That is what
happened.” He never deviates from his admission. He refuses to
entertain a plea bargain, insists on going to trial, and does not wish to
testify.52
b. Criminal Defendants Do Admit Their Guilt
A popular myth has developed, no doubt fed in large part by movies,
television shows, and literature, that criminal defense attorneys never
ask clients what actually happened. 53 Instead, they say things such as,
“Now I don’t want to know if you are guilty,” or “Before you begin, let
me first tell you about the law.”54 Some lawyers do in fact adopt this
approach.55 The logic of this approach seems to rest on the notion that,
if a client admits his guilt, his lawyer cannot later allow him to change

51. This particular scenario was inspired by the movie the Naked Gun.
Mayor: Drebin, I don’t want any more trouble like you had last year on the
Southside. Understand? That’s my policy.
Frank: Yes. Well, when I see 5 weirdos dressed in togas stabbing a guy in the
middle of the park in full view of 100 people, I shoot the bastards. That’s my policy.
Mayor: That was a Shakespeare in the Park production of Julius Caesar, you moron!
You killed 5 actors! Good ones!
THE NAKED GUN: FROM THE FILES OF POLICE SQUAD! (Paramount Pictures 1988).
52. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the
defendant cannot be made to testify at trial if he wishes not to. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in relevant part, “No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Id.
53. Perhaps the most famous example of this can be seen in the movie Anatomy of a
Murder. Before asking his client, played by Ben Gazzara, to explain what occurred, the
attorney, played by Jimmy Stewart, explains what the legal defenses to murder are in the state
of Michigan and how those defenses can be advanced based on the proof that the police have
accumulated. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959); see also ROBERT
TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 37 (1958); Samuel Dash, Ethical Defense of Accused
Persons, U.S. AIR FORCE JAG BULL., Jan. 1962, at 12, 13 (commenting on the “the best
selling novel, ‘Anatomy of a Murder,’” and its effect on public perception of how lawyers
conduct client interviews).
54. See Dash, supra note 53, at 13.
55. Id.
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his story and testify to his innocence at trial, as that would be perjury.56
Furthermore, if a client is made aware of the state’s case prior to telling
his lawyer what happened and is informed of possible legal justifications
that might excuse his conduct, the client can then tailor, or invent, an
exculpatory story that conforms to the state’s evidence and testify
accordingly.57
By in large, however, this approach is the stuff of popular culture
more than the actual practice of law because defense attorneys
understand the danger of this approach quite well.58 When the lawyer
only asks for the client’s version of the facts after the client has been
told how the state’s facts relate to the law, or the lawyer tells his client
he does not want to know if the client is actually guilty, the “client may
be tempted to make up a story that is not totally consistent with what
occurred.”59 As a result, the client’s story may represent an exaggerated
version of events that the jury sees as lying; may prevent defense
counsel from learning about facts that would be important to address at
trial (because witnesses in criminal cases do in fact testify to facts that
are not always reflected in pre-trial discovery and the prosecution can
call rebuttal witnesses); and may put defense counsel at a disadvantage
in determining how hard he can press during his examination of the
state’s witnesses.60
Therefore, it is not surprising to hear Samuel Dash, the famed Chief
Counsel for the Senate Watergate Committee, observe, “Any good
defense lawyer wants to know from the start all the true facts known by
the client concerning the charge against him without embellishment or
distortion.”61
Certainly, if the client admits his guilt, in most
circumstances (the exception being a version of diminished capacity or
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2014).
57. Whether or not this approach is itself ethical is a matter about which legal
commenters disagree. Professor Samuel Dash has referred to this approach as coaching the
client and has opined that “the coaching of a client before he tells his story ethically
improper.” Dash, supra note 53, at 13. However, Professor Randolph Braccialarghe
maintains that this type of client interview is ethically permissible because the lawyer is not
“actively introducing false evidence or untruth into the system.” Randolph Braccialarghe,
Why Were Perry Mason’s Clients Always Innocent? The Criminal Lawyer’s Moral Dilemma—
The Criminal Defendant Who Tells His Lawyer He Is Guilty, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 72–73
(2004).
58. See Dash, supra note 53, at 13.
59. See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 72–73.
60. See id. at 72–73; see also Dash, supra note 53, at 13.
61. See Dash, supra note 53, at 13.
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self-defense), the client’s attorney will not be able to put the client on
the stand to tell a different story without committing perjury.62
Nevertheless, legal commentators have observed that it is advantageous
to permit a client to speak freely with his attorney, even to the point of
the client admitting his guilt.63
It is certainly the case that, even if defense counsel makes clear to his
client that he wants to know all of the bad facts (even if that means the
client admits guilt), guilty clients nevertheless insist they are innocent.64
However, unlike the fictional television shows in which most clients are
actually innocent, the real-life experiences of lawyers do in fact involve
representing admittedly guilty clients who insist on going to trial.65 It is
for this reason that Dash further observes that, when the attorney knows
all of the true facts concerning the charge against the defendant, the
attorney is then “able to make the soundest and most intelligent
judgment concerning fact investigation, legal research and strategy.”66
62. See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 72.
63. See id. at 73 (“[T]here appears to be a certain advantage to permitting a client to
speak freely with his attorney to the point of even admitting that he has committed the act he
is accused of committing.”).
64. See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About
Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (commenting on his experience at the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia and observing that in in his experience “those
charged with very serious offenses do not readily admit guilt to their attorney” and that, in his
opinion, often times “clients believe that defense attorneys will give better representation to
clients whom they believe are innocent”).
65. See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 69. Professor Braccialarghe uses the fictional
Perry Mason television show as an example. Id. at 70. He laments that while Perry Mason’s
clients were always innocent, in the real life practice of law that is certainly not always the
case. Id. Professor Braccialarghe comments,
Hence, if popular culture were to more accurately portray to the public the criminal
defense attorney’s function, one would have to rewrite those Perry Mason (and Ben
Mattlock) television episodes to have Perry’s secretary, Della Street, or his
investigator, Paul Drake, congratulate Perry on having successfully convinced a jury
to acquit a guilty client. And then, at the celebratory dinner when Hamilton Burger
comes over to Perry’s table, Hamilton could say something to the effect of,
“Celebrate all you want now Perry, but we will pick him up the next time he kills
somebody, and he probably won’t have enough money to hire you a second time.”
It is unlikely that a television series that routinely shows lawyers using their skills to
allow guilty clients to go free would have much success with the public. Nor would
these shows do much for lawyers’ self-esteem or their reputations with the public.
Id.
66. Dash, supra note 12, at 13. To that end, Professor Randolph Braccialarghe has
made the following observation:
On several occasions, when speaking at continuing legal education seminars
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c. It Is Possible to Know That a Defense Theory Is Actually False
Further, just as some believe that criminal defense attorneys do not
know if their client is guilty, there is a myth that there is really no such
thing as a false defense.67 Therefore, no further discussion concerning
the ethical limitations of how a false defense is advanced by discrediting
a witness is necessary. These commentators reason that there is no such
thing as a false defense or any attendant ethical prohibitions involved in
its use (with certain obvious exceptions such as fabricating evidence)
because an attorney can never really “know” that a particular theory of
defense is actually false.68
Much of this argument is premised on what some scholars have
called the “indeterminacy of truth.”69 For example, perhaps the
defendant never committed the crime but tells his lawyer that he is
guilty to protect the actual guilty party. Perhaps the defendant is afraid
that the guilty party will harm him or his family if the defendant refuses
to “take the rap.” Or perhaps the defendant is not guilty but may be
potentially embarrassed to admit the circumstances surrounding his
arrest, even if they are exculpatory in nature. In this regard, whatever
theory defense counsel comes up with may actually be true because the
defense attorney does not actually know it is false. However, current
ethical guidelines and decisional law have rejected this position.70
In terms of suggesting that an attorney can never actually know what
really happened, assuming the defense attorney was not present at the
scene of the crime, this is literally true. However, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Model Rule 1.0(f), as well as Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers section 120, have denoted that, while
knowledge is to be considered “actual knowledge” of a fact in question,

attended by criminal defense lawyers, I have asked the lawyers present for a show of
hands of those who have succeeded in getting jury acquittals in the last year or so. I
then asked those individuals how they had gotten those acquittals. The vast
majority have said that they found it more successful to have their clients tell them
everything, even if that meant that the client could not later take the stand. Client
candor increases the attorney’s ability to meet and overcome the state’s evidence.
Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 73 n.30.
67. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 343.
68. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140.
69. Id. at 1140–41; see also Freedman, supra note 2, at 1472.
70. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
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“[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”71 By
making clear that knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, the
rules ultimately demonstrate that current ethics guidelines have rejected
the assertion that a lawyer must literally know something is false in
order to constitute knowledge of a falsehood. Professor Steven Lubet
has noted, “As an ethical matter . . . we should be more ready to assume
that our client’s words—both helpful and damaging—are likely to be
true. It is after all, the client’s case.”72
Further, in the seminal case of Nix v. Whiteside,73 in which defense
counsel threatened to withdraw from his client’s case if his client insisted
on testifying falsely, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
accepted the trial court’s conclusion that Whiteside’s lawyer knew that
Whiteside intended to commit perjury.74 Therefore, insisting that a
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“A lawyer’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.”); Erin K. Jaskot &
Christopher J. Mulligan, Witness Testimony and the Knowledge Requirement: An Atypical
Approach to Defining Knowledge and Its Effect on the Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 845–46 (2004) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)). This is not to suggest that it is always easy to discern when
knowledge may be inferred based on circumstantial evidence. Beyond the most obvious
circumstances, courts have articulated different standards for what constitutes knowledge.
Jaskot & Mulligan, supra, at 847. These definitions have ranged from circumstantial
evidence, a good faith belief, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to a “firm factual basis.” Id.
(citing Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, Note, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing
Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935, 943–44 (2002)).
72. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 5 (4th ed.
2009).
73. 475 U.S. at 172.
74. Id. at 161, 163. Immediately before his trial for murder, the defendant Whiteside
told his court-appointed attorney Robinson that he intended to testify that when he stabbed
the deceased, he thought the deceased was pulling out a pistol and that he had seen
something metallic in the deceased’s hand. Id. at 161. His proposed testimony about
“something metallic” was inconsistent with his prior statements to his attorney as well as the
other evidence. Id. at 160–62. Robinson told Whiteside that such testimony would be
perjury. Id. at 161. When Whiteside insisted that he intended to testify he had seen
something metallic, Robinson responded that if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury, he
would advise the court that Whiteside was committing perjury, seek to withdraw, and attempt
to impeach Whiteside’s false testimony. Id. When Whiteside testified, he explained why he
thought the deceased had a gun but admitted that he had not actually seen one and did not
claim that he had seen something metallic. Id. at 161–62. The jury returned a verdict of
second-degree murder. Id. at 162. In his attack on his conviction, Whiteside argued that he
had been deprived of a fair trial by Robinson’s threats, which prevented him from testifying
that he had seen a gun or something metallic. Id. Whiteside argued that his trial attorney’s
threats to inform the court of his perjured testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 162–63. The Supreme Court analyzed this claim under
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lawyer can never actually know what is true and what is false runs
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Nix v. Whiteside in which
“the Supreme Court established clear boundaries on when knowledge
would be presumed.”75
Therefore, both relevant ethics guidelines and the Court’s holding in
Nix v. Whiteside demonstrate that existing legal authority recognizes
that defense counsel can in fact know that a particular defense theory is
false and that a particular witness is telling the truth.76 As will be seen
shortly, however, knowledge that a defense is false in no way prevents a
defense attorney from discrediting a truthful witness.77 Instead, this
knowledge only impacts the means by which a truthful witness may be
discredited.78
d. The False Theory of Defense in Commonwealth v. Cassidy
Based on the hypothetical facts offered above, the defense attorney
has invented the following trial theory knowing full well that it is not
true because the defendant admitted he committed the crime.
Defense counsel will implore the jury to believe that the police
officer is incompetent and quick to pull the trigger. In this telling, the
officer overreacted (per his tendency) and shot an unarmed civilian,
planted a gun on the defendant, and then lied about the defendant
possessing the gun. The defense attorney will suggest such by
insinuating that parts of the police officer’s story are incredible (i.e., the
ability to see the gun at a distance of forty-five feet at night in poor
lighting conditions and that the five-pound gun could actually be held in
the elastic waistband of the defendant’s sweatpants). The defense
attorney will argue that the police officer’s version of events is
untruthful because the police officer has a motive to fabricate and plant
a gun on the person he shot. The officer must provide his own

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its prejudice and performance standards.
Nix, 475 U.S. at 175 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694–95). The Court held that Whiteside’s
contentions did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice standard and that Robinson’s performance
had satisfied Strickland’s performance standard in that it had been well within the range of
effective representation “in accord with professional standards.” Id. at 175–76.
75. See Suni, supra note 9, at 1654 n.43 (citing Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140).
76. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 176; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2014).
77. See infra Part III.B.
78. See infra Part III.B.
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exculpatory version of events to justify the shooting and to avoid losing
his job or criminal prosecution.
To advance this particular trial theory, the defense attorney must
first cross-examine the truthful prosecution witness with the goal of
discrediting his version of events. Later the defense attorney will
present a closing argument in which he argues that the police officer’s
version of events is not to be believed based on the facts established on
cross-examination.
2. Cross-Examination Strategies
a. Cross-Examination Based on Eliciting True Facts
The hallmark of this type of cross-examination is that defense
counsel will only ask questions on cross-examination designed to illicit
truthful responses from the prosecution witness. In some respects, this
type of cross-examination may appear underwhelming and the theory of
defense may not be readily apparent. However, during closing
argument, defense counsel can later use these truthful answers to string
together a series of inferences that collectively weaken the state’s case.79
In the context of the Cassidy case, this type of cross-examination would
look something like this:
Q: Officer, when you arrived at the scene you parked your car
about forty-five feet away from my client?
A: Correct.
Q: It was dark out, wasn’t it?
A: It was.
Q: Wasn’t the closest street light forty-five feet away from where
the shooting took place?
A: That’s about right.
A: You were not using your flashlight?
A: I never had my flashlight out.
Q: My client was wearing sweatpants, correct?

79. An inference is defined as “[a] conclusion reached by considering other facts and
deducing a logical consequence from them” or “[t]he process by which such a conclusion is
reached; the process of thought by which one moves from evidence to proof.” Inference,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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A: Yes.
Q: They have an elastic band?
A: Yes, I believe so.
Q: This gun weighed five pounds?
A: I believe that is correct based on what it says in the report.
Q: It’s your testimony that the gun weighing five pounds was
being held up by the elastic waistband of my client’s pants.
A: That is what I saw.
Q: Officer Drebin, isn’t it true that you previously shot numerous
individuals in the park and only got a warning for it?
A: Yes, but that was justified. I thought they were stabbing that
man to death and Internal Affairs understood. They only gave
me a warning.
Q: You’re currently on probation with internal affairs, aren’t
you?
A: Yes.
Q: They have told you that one more unjustified shooting and
you’ll be fired, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, if Internal Affairs doesn’t clear the shooting, you can
be charged criminally?
A: I suppose that’s right.
b. The False-Story Cross-Examination
Unlike the “true answers” cross-examination detailed above, this
particular type of cross-examination operates in exactly the opposite
manner. In other words, it is premised on defense counsel asking the
witness a series of questions in which defense counsel knows that the
underlying factual predicate on which the question is based is false.80
When defense counsel asks the witness a question, he expects the
witness to deny the question’s implication by answering in the
negative.81 As a result, the questions asked on cross-examination

80. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (1997).
81. See Subin, supra note 1, at 126.
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amount to nothing more than innuendo the defense attorney knows to
be false. However, unlike a cross-examination based on true facts, this
type of cross-examination is generally not underwhelming. The “falsestory” cross-examination allows the defense attorney to present the full
theory of defense as an alternative story to the one being offered by the
prosecution through the questions asked on cross-examination.82 This
type of cross-examination would look something like this:
Q: Officer Drebin, isn’t it true that you never saw my client reach
for the gun because it was too dark?
A: I did see him reach for the gun.
Q: Really, weren’t you too quick to pull the trigger just like you
were in the park incident?
A: Please, that was totally justified.
Q: In fact, isn’t it true that my client never had a gun at all?
A: That is definitely not true.
Q: Listen—let’s be honest. You knew you couldn’t tell Internal
Affairs the truth that you shot an unarmed man in the leg
because you would lose your job, isn’t that correct?
A: No, he was armed. I told Internal Affairs the truth.
Q: Weren’t you afraid that if Mr. Cassidy died you would be
charged with murder?
A: He tried to shoot me.
Q: You knew you had to plant a gun on him to justify the
shooting, didn’t you?
A: I don’t know how many times I have to tell you this; he
reached for his gun.
Q: After you shot him, you put the gun in his hand, didn’t you?
A: You’re a liar. I never did that.
The above cross-examination is referred to as the false-story crossexamination because its design closely adheres to the definition of a
story.83 Through the attorney’s questions, the defense theory of
innocence is presented as (1) a purposefully ordered sequence of events,
82. See id. at 126, 133–35.
83. See Posner, supra note 80, at 738–39.
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designed to achieve a specific goal,84 while (2) explaining these events by
focusing on characters, their goals, and their struggles to achieve their
goals.85 Thus, the above false-story cross-examination presents an
alternative story to the jury (that the gun was planted on Quinton
Cassidy), and this alternative version of events is explored from the
perspective of Officer Drebin’s penchant for incompetence and his
motive to fabricate.
3. Closing Arguments
a. The False-Implication Closing Argument
This type of closing argument has two salient features. First, the
defense attorney never explicitly says anything to the jury that he knows
to be untrue.86 Importantly, this includes not telling the jury that the
defendant is innocent but merely that the defendant is not guilty.87
84. Id.
85. Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of
Story, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 9 (2010). Professor Kenneth D. Chestek
has noted, if all that is provided is a purposely ordered sequence of events, this is not so much
a story as an “information-based narrative[].” Id. As a result, a true story needs “sufficient
context to allow the reader to fully see and understand why the participants in the story
behaved as they did, and what they were trying to accomplish in the face of various
obstacles.” Id. Professor Ruth Anne Robbins has further posited that
[w]ithin the legal framework, a story has a few key elements: character, point of
view, conflict, resolution, organization, and description. The story must contain a
cast of characters, and the author must choose to tell the story from someone’s point
of view. Each character has needs and goals. The author controls how much the
audience knows about those needs and goals.
Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using
the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767,
772 (2006) (footnote omitted).
86. See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1065; Subin, supra note 1, at 126–27, 134–35.
87. Being not guilty and being innocent are not the same thing. A finding of not guilty
is a legal construct that relates only to forcing the state to prove each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, asserting that the state cannot prove each element of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as a specific declaration that the defendant
never committed the crime in the first place. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1471 (“The plea
of not guilty does not necessarily mean ‘not guilty in fact,’ for the defendant may mean ‘not
legally guilty.”). Even the accused who knows that he committed the crime is entitled to put
the government to its proof. Carl M. Selinger, Dramatizing on Film the Uneasy Role of the
American Criminal Defense Lawyer: True Believer, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 223, 227–28
(1997) (“In this country, there is no question that criminal defense lawyers may ethically
plead admittedly guilty clients ‘not guilty,’ and argue that their guilt has not been proved.”);
see also Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 270 (2002) (“The criminal
justice system is not designed to grant moral absolution or to declare innocence. While
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Second, the jury is presented with an alternative explanation that
exculpates the defendant without the trial attorney affirmatively telling
the jury something he knows to be false.88 As a result, the theory of
defense is never explicitly told to the jury. Instead, the jury is only
asked to draw false inferences from true facts and to evaluate the
evidence through the prism of reasonable doubt.89 As a result, the
theory of defense is only implied—it is never actually stated.
In the Cassidy case, this type of closing argument might go as
follows:
My client is not guilty of the crime with which he has been
charged. I ask you ladies and gentleman of the jury to consider
the following: The government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that my client possessed a firearm. To do so, you must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer saw the
firearm on a dark street with poor lighting conditions. You
should also ask yourself if my client was able to hold a fivepound handgun in the elastic of his waistband.
When deciding if they have proven their case beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must ask yourself if you believe the
evidence the government has presented without stopping,
hesitating, or seriously considering that evidence before reaching
a verdict of guilty.90 In deciding whether to believe the police
officer, you must also consider that this officer had a lot to lose if
he was found to have shot an unarmed citizen. He is on
probation for doing the same thing. He could lose his job. He
could even be charged with murder or attempted murder.
Officer Drebin has a much better chance of not being fired or
charged with a crime if the person he shot just happened to have
had a gun rather than if the officer had once again shot an
unarmed civilian.

innocence cannot necessarily be inferred from an acquittal, a conviction implies the certainty
of guilt.” (footnote omitted)).
88. See Subin, supra note 27, at 690.
89. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357.
90. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 720 A.2d 473, 481–82 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a jury
instruction which defines reasonable doubt as the type of doubt that causes a reasonable
person to “stop, hesitate and seriously consider” whether he would do a certain thing before
finally acting adequately conveys the legal principle that is reasonable doubt).

2015]

DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS

307

b. The Evidence-Reflects Closing Argument
The hallmark of the “evidence-reflects” closing argument91 is that
the lawyer makes sure to use a qualifying phrase when asking the jury to
expressly draw an inference that the lawyer knows to be untrue.92 This
type of closing argument can more directly state the theory of defense
simply by prefacing those statements with the appropriate qualifying
language, as opposed to relying exclusively on implication.93 By using
these types of qualifying statements the lawyer is not expressly vouching
for an alternative version of events to the one presented by the state, but
merely stating that the evidence technically reflects such a possibility.
However, when making this type of closing argument, the lawyer
need not preface every statement by qualifying it first with “the
evidence reflects.” The lawyer can, of course, still continue to make the
types of statements that are used in the false implication closing
argument that are technically true and only imply the theory of defense.
In this regard, the evidence-reflects type of argument is really a
modified version of the false-implication closing argument.
In the Cassidy case, this type of closing argument might look
something like this:
The evidence reflects that my client is innocent. The
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my
client possessed a firearm. The evidence demonstrates that the
police officer could not see the firearm on a dark street with poor
lighting conditions. The evidence also shows that my client could
not hold that five-pound gun in the elastic waistband of his
sweatpants.
You have heard evidence relating to how much the police
officer has to lose if he was found to have shot an unarmed
citizen. He is on probation for doing the same thing. He could
lose his job. He could even be charged with murder or
attempted murder. Officer Drebin has a much better chance of
not being fired or charged with a crime if the person he shot just
happened to have had a gun rather than if the officer had once
91. While this Article refers to this as the evidence-reflects closing argument, defense
counsel could just as easily use interchangeable phrases such as “the evidence shows” or the
“evidence demonstrates,” all of which connote the same point.
92. See JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS: THE ART AND THE LAW § 1:17
(2015).
93. See id.
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again shot an unarmed civilian. Officer Drebin has a motive to
lie about what happened that day. The evidence reflects that
Officer Drebin planted that gun on my client.
c. The False-Story Closing Argument
The “false-story” closing argument differs significantly from the
false-implication and evidence-reflects types of closing arguments.
While the defense attorney who uses the false-story closing argument
also asks the jury to draw false inferences from true facts, in doing so,
the attorney phrases that argument through a series of explicit
statements that he knows to be false, without the use of any qualifying
language.94 This includes affirmatively stating that the defendant is
actually innocent of the crime charged.95
All of the above types of closing arguments are designed to present
an alternative version of what really happened.96 However, because the
false-story closing argument is not wed to true statements, the theory is
told to the jury in the story form described previously, as opposed to
suggesting to the jury in a series of carefully worded and qualified
statements asking the jury to draw certain inferences.97 It is for this
reason that this technique is referred to as the false-story closing
argument.
In the Commonwealth v. Cassidy, this type of closing argument looks
like this:
Now, ladies and gentleman of the jury, my client is innocent.
Officer Drebin has testified about his version of what happened.
Officer Drebin is lying. Now let me tell you what really went
down out there. Officer Drebin can’t be believed when he says
he saw my client with a gun. In those dark lighting conditions, he
couldn’t see anything. There is no way my client could carry a
five-pound gun in the elastic of his sweatpants without it falling
out. That version of events would be laughable if it wasn’t for
the fact that charging an innocent man with a crime is no
laughing matter.
Here’s what really happened. The police officer responded
to the scene and saw my client minding his own business. My
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357.
See Braccialarghe, supra note 57.
See Subin, supra note 27, at 689–90.
See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357.
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client turned to walk away from the officer, but the officer had a
quick trigger finger, just like he has had before. Officer Drebin
got scared out there on the street. When my client went to turn
and respond to the officer, the officer couldn’t see what was in
my client’s hands because of how dark it was. Drebin lost his
cool. He shot first and decided he would deal with the
consequences later.
After he realized my client never had a gun in the first place,
Police Officer Drebin planted the gun on my client. Officer
Drebin knew he was on thin ice. He put the gun in my client’s
hand. That’s why the gun has my client’s fingerprints on it.
Anything to avoid losing his job or even being charged with
murder.
B. The Ethical Status of Methods for Discrediting Truthful Witnesses
1. Governing Ethical Rules and Standards
The ethical limitations of the above types of cross-examinations and
closing arguments can be examined from the perspective of the three
primary sources of ethical guidance for American lawyers. These are
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,98 the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,99 and
the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and
Defense Function.100 These guidelines fall into two general categories:
rules and standards.101 The primary difference between the two is that
rules are binding and violating an ethical rule may lead to disciplinary
action,102 while ethical standards are non-binding resolutions that are
primarily intended to act as a best-practices model.103
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
100. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
101. Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical
Standards that Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 916
(2011).
102. Cecelia Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal
Justice Standards (Don’t) Say About the Duties of Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 983, 984–85 (2011) (noting that the most influential source of guidance for attorney
conduct “will be the rules of professional conduct that govern the behavior of lawyers within
a specified jurisdiction: Because breach may result in professional sanction, lawyers are likely
to pay close attention to the content of these rules”). Enforcement of formal ethics rules is
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The most important set of ethics rules that regulate attorney conduct
are the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model Rules
have been adopted, at least in part, as the formal ethics rules by every
state in the country, with the exception of California.104 A violation of
these rules can result in a state authorized sanction.105 While nonbinding, the ABA Standards and the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers have also proven to be important, additional
sources of guidance for administrative bodies and organizations tasked
with issues of attorney discipline and ethics compliance.106

largely done through formal disciplinary proceedings before a state bar or high court.
MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 42–43 (8th ed. 2007); see
also Medwed, supra note 101, at 916.
103. Medwed, supra note 101, at 916.
104. “The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA House
of Delegates in 1983. . . . Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA model was the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Preceding the Model Code was the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics.” ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct.html [http://perma.cc/9ZJA-R4CZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2014)
(providing a history of the evolution of ABA ethics codes). Oversight of attorney conduct in
federal courts is not based on a uniform set of rules. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 76 (2009). Instead,
different federal courts regulate attorney conduct by picking and choosing between local state
rules, their own standards, and ABA models. Id.
105. See Klingele, supra note 102, at 984–85.
106. The ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice have no legal authority unless adopted
by a court or legislature. Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011); see
also Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of
Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 10, 11. Despite this fact, while generally non-binding,
the Standards for Criminal Justice function as a potentially influential source of guidance in
terms of defining the ethical limitations of attorney conduct. Klingele, supra note 102, at 985.
While also non-binding, another important source of ethical guidance comes from the
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. The primary
goal of the Restatement is not to supplant ABA ethics guidelines, but to complement them.
The Restatement, therefore, is influenced not only by ABA ethics rules but also by decisional
law and other statutory text. Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 712 (1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at xxxvi (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996)). In this sense, the Restatement reflects the drafter’s
objective “to clarify the law and to provide a text that courts and other legal bodies deciding
contested cases can employ confidently as a general statement of relevant legal doctrine.”
Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541
(1997) (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 211 (1987)).
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2. Applying Ethical Rules to Lawyer’s Techniques
a. The True-Facts Cross-Examination Is Ethical
In terms of cross-examination, perhaps the most important guiding
principle emerging from each of the above three sets of ethical
regulations is that, prior to questioning a witness, a good faith basis must
exist to support the questions’ underlying implication.107 In terms of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the good faith basis requirement
on cross-examination is found in Model Rule 3.4(e), providing that a
lawyer may not “allude to any matter . . . that will not be supported by
admissible evidence.”108 While Model Rule 3.4(e) does not use the
actual words “good faith basis,” or specifically reference crossexamination, commentators and courts have generally viewed Model
Rule 3.4(e) as requiring a good faith basis for the questions asked on
cross-examination.109 While Model Rule 3.4(e) is silent with respect to
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2000); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also
Steven Lubet, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance: Truth or Justice in the Old West, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 353, 365 (2000) (“This principle, also referred to as the ‘good faith basis’ rule,
provides that lawyers must build their cases on a foundation of truth. They are free to use
their questions to intimate all manner of guilt-negating possibilities, but only on the basis of
truthful answers.”).
While legal commentators and courts agree that the good faith basis on crossexamination rule is encompassed in Model Rule 3.4(e), not all commentators agree. Daniel
D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10
(2006). For example, one commentator says:
Rule 3.4(e) appears principally concerned with “allusions” and statements by
counsel during opening and closing arguments, and not the evidentiary phase of
trial. The opening clause’s use of the future tense—“allude to any matter that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence”—seems oriented toward counsel’s opening statements. And
the remainder of 3.4(e) is expressly limited to statements by counsel, which
generally occur during the opening or closing argument.
Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004)). In light
of Professor Blinka’s contention, this Article will also apply Model Rule 3.4(e) to its analysis
of the ethical limits of closing arguments.
109. E.g., Lubet, supra note 108, at 365; see also In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 867 (Ariz.
2004) (finding impermissible the prosecutor’s questions implying a mental health expert had
fabricated his diagnosis of the defendant in the absence of a good faith basis under several of
Arizona’s ethics rules, including its equivalent of 3.4(e)); State v. Tosh, 91 P.3d 1204, 1209,
1215 (Kan. 2004) (holding that it was a violation of Rule 3.4(e) of the Kansas Rules of
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what level of proof constitutes “admissible evidence,” decisional law has
provided that a “reasonable suspicion” that the facts implied by the
question are true will suffice to satisfy an attorney’s ethical
obligations.110 Importantly, confidential statements made by a client
during the attorney-client interview satisfy the good faith basis test.111
Restatement section 107(2) appears to be the Restatement’s version
of Model Rule 3.4(e) and uses virtually identical language.112 The

Professional Conduct for the prosecution to ask the defendant if he ever intended to plead
guilty without a factual basis for the question).
The good faith basis rule, in addition to being an actual ethics rule, also exists as a rule of
evidence. Where evidentiary principles and legal ethics intersect, one scholar has noted that
it may not always be clear which body of law preceded the other and, “[a]lthough it is difficult
to tell which came first, certain well-established evidentiary principles seem to stem directly
from professional standards.” Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions
“Law”?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2007).
The evidentiary version of the good faith basis rule does not appear expressly in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Arguably, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its prohibition on
evidence that would represent an unfair prejudice encompass the good faith basis rule. FED.
R. EVID. 403. However, the rule clearly pre-dates the formal adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975 and existed as a common law rule of evidence. See Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 470–74 (1948); United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. West, 460 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582,
588 (2d Cir. 1963); Roberson v. United States, 237 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1956); see also
United States v. Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d
222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1970). All of these cases pre-date the formal adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and all hold that the prosecution must have some good faith factual basis
for the incidents inquired about on cross-examination when impeaching a defense character
witness. Both state and federal courts apply the good faith basis requirement. See King v.
State, 89 So. 3d 209, 224 (Fla. 2012); Chavies v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 322 (Ky.
2012); Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000); State v. Dawson, 268 S.E.2d 572, 576
(N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Wynter, 770 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(citing United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hall,
989 F.2d 711, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1993)) (noting not only that Massachusetts requires a good
faith basis for questions asked on cross-examination, but that “Federal cases are in accord”).
Additionally, courts have held that the prohibition against asking questions on crossexamination without a good faith basis does not violate the criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. See United States v. Beck, 625 F.3d 410, 417–20 (7th Cir.
2010).
110. See State v. Marble, 901 P.2d 521, 524–25 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); see also United
States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
111. J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 487, 501
(2002).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“In representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer may not, in the
presence of the trier of fact allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.”).
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commentary to this particular rule makes clear that, like its Model Rule
counterpart, it also contains its own good faith requirement.113
For its part, the ABA Standards explicitly prohibit the asking of a
question on cross-examination without a good faith basis.114 ABA
Standard 4-7.6(d) states, “Defense counsel should not ask a question
which implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith
belief is lacking.”115 The comment to ABA Standard 4-7.6(d) defines
what it means by a good faith basis by providing that a good faith basis
does not exist when a cross-examiner asks a question “that would be
advantageous to have answered in the negative” when the crossexaminer has no evidence to support the question’s implication116 or
innuendo.117
The underlying rationale for the good faith basis requirement stems
from the concern that “[f]alse insinuations in a question, even if
followed by an indignant denial from the witness, undoubtedly leave a
trace of prejudice in the jury’s mind.”118 As one court has sternly noted,
“If this rule is breached, the violator should be severely censured. Such
practice is impermissible and should not be tolerated.”119
A basic application of the above ethical standards indicates that the
cross-examination, which is designed only to elicit true facts,120 is
ethically permissible, even though it will eventually be used to cast
113. Under a heading entitled “‘Backdoor’ methods of proof of an inadmissible matter,”
the commentary to this Restatement section notes disapprovingly that “[t]rial maneuvers can
be calculated to suggest to the fact-finder (especially a jury) legally irrelevant and otherwise
inadmissible evidence or considerations.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000). For the purposes of the instant
discussion, the most relevant of the commentary’s examples provides that “[a] lawyer may not
offer evidence on the representation that a proper foundation will be laid for its admission
when the lawyer has no reasonable basis for believing that . . . such a foundation can be
provided.” Id.
114. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 4-7.6 cmt.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
119. United States v. Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
120. A cross-examination is defined as “[t]he questioning of a witness at trial or hearing
by the party opposed to the party in whose favor the witness has testified” that is meant “to
discredit a witness before the fact-finder in any of several ways, as by bringing out
contradictions and improbabilities in earlier testimony, by suggesting doubts to the witness,
and by trapping the witness into admissions that weaken the testimony.” Cross-examination,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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doubt on the witness’s version of events. The reason for this is simply
that every question that is asked is done so with a good faith basis. The
crux of the good faith basis rule in each of the three sets of standards
requires that a cross-examiner possess a certain degree of evidence that
supports the underlying factual predicate upon which each question is
based.121 In the previously provided true-facts cross-examination,122
every question asked is designed to elicit a truthful response and is
supported by actual evidence. For example, when the lawyer asks, “It
was dark out?”—the lawyer knows it was dark out at 7:00 p.m. in
February. Or when the lawyer asks about Officer Drebin being on
probation with Internal Affairs, the lawyer knows this is, in fact, true.
While the lawyer may use the witness’s truthful answers during closing
argument to suggest both the implausibility of the witness’s story and his
motive to fabricate it, as Professor Steven Lubet has observed, the good
faith basis rule allows lawyers “to use their questions to intimate all
manner of guilt-negating possibilities, but only on the basis of truthful
answers.”123
b. The False-Story Cross-Examination Is Unethical
However, the previously provided false-story cross-examination that
is designed to place before the jury a story in the form of explicit
suggestions that defense counsel knows to be false is plainly unethical.
This is because the defense attorney’s questions are not premised on a
good faith basis. Instead, defense counsel knows that he is planting a
version of events in the jury’s mind by forcing the witness to deny the
answer suggested by each question.124 For example, in the Cassidy case,
when the defense attorney asks Officer Drebin a question about
planting the gun on the defendant, or suggests that the defendant posed
no danger to the officer because the defendant was never in possession
of a gun in the first place, the attorney knows both of these suggestions

121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2000); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
122. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
123. Lubet, supra note 108, at 365.
124. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.6 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (describing how such questioning is
unethical).
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are false. He most certainly, in the words of one court, does not have a
“well reasoned suspicion that a circumstance is true.”125
c. The False-Implication and Evidence-Reflects Closing Arguments Are
Ethical
In each of the three closing arguments thus far described in this
Article, defense counsel is advancing a false defense by asking the fact
finder to disbelieve the prosecution’s witness whom defense counsel
knows is telling the truth. However, of these techniques, the falseimplication and evidence-reflects techniques are ethically permissible,
while the false-story technique is not.
In terms of the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing
arguments, it is essential to note that the closing arguments only ask the
jury to draw reasonable inferences based entirely on the existence of
admissible evidence, without ever explicitly telling the jury something
the defense attorney knows to be untrue. In this sense, both types of
closing arguments present the jury with an alternative version of events,
without technically asserting the truth of those alternatives. Even
though these types of closing arguments attempt to create a false
impression by asking the jury to draw a series of knowingly false
inferences concerning the witness’s version of events, this attempt to
mislead the jury is entirely within the limits of existing ethical guidelines.
Neither the false implication nor evidence reflects closing arguments
violate Model Rule 3.4(e) or Restatement section 107 and their
prohibition against alluding “to any matter . . . that will not be supported
by admissible evidence.”126 In fact, each false inference the jury is asked
to draw in both types of closing arguments is supported by admissible
evidence. For example, when defense counsel suggests that Officer
Drebin’s story is incredible because of the difficulty of seeing the gun in
dark lighting conditions and by pointing out that Officer Drebin had a
motive to fabricate his testimony, those inferences are supported by the
evidence in the actual trial record concerning the lighting conditions and
the officer’s problems with Internal Affairs.

125. United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir.1980).
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2000); see also Blinka, supra note 108, at 10 (noting that some legal commentators believe
that Model Rule 3.4(e) was intended to apply to opening and closing arguments).
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Further, the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing
arguments do not violate Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) or (3) regarding Candor
to the Tribunal.127 While the rule itself does not specifically indicate that
it applies to closing arguments,128 commentators and courts have
interpreted the rule to apply to this particular phase of the trial
process.129 Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that a “lawyer shall not
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”130 Model
Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides that a lawyer cannot offer evidence that is
known to be false.131 A close examination of both types of closing
arguments indicates that defense counsel attempted neither.
First, neither closing argument violates the plain language of Model
Rule 3.3(a)(1) because defense counsel never makes any false
statements of fact. In terms of the false-implication closing argument,
when defense counsel states that in order to find the defendant guilty
the jury “must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer
saw the firearm on a dark street,” that statement is undeniably true
based on the facts of the case as developed on cross-examination.
Defense counsel never explicitly states that the officer did not see the
gun or that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime. Further, the
lawyer does not state that the police officer actually planted the gun on
the defendant. Instead, the lawyer only implies such by asking the jury
to draw this inference. He does this by stating something that is
technically true. He says, “You must also consider that this officer had a
lot to lose if he was found to have shot an unarmed citizen,” and defense
counsel also says, “Officer Drebin has a much better chance of not being
fired or charged with a crime if the person he shot just so happened to
have had a gun rather than once again shooting an unarmed civilian.”
Indeed, most reasonable people can accept as a general truism that

127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1), (3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
128. Id.
129. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (cross-referencing its regulation of
closing argument with the Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)); see also Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458,
469 (Ind. 2012) (applying Indiana’s adoption of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
3.3(a)(1) to arguments made before the jury in the penalty phase of a death penalty trial);
Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1063 (referencing Model Rule 3.3 and noting that
“advocates may neither offer nor argue evidence they know to be false”); Suni, supra note 9,
at 1662–64 (analyzing the application of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 to
closing arguments in which defense counsel argues false inferences from true facts).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
131. Id. at r. 3.3(a)(3).
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police officers who shoot unarmed citizens without sufficient
justification can end up in serious trouble.
Admittedly, the evidence-reflects closing argument appears
somewhat closer to making a false statement and, therefore, closer to
the ethical line than the false-implication closing argument. However,
an analysis of the evidence-reflects type of closing argument indicates
that it does not contain statements that are false. In this regard, it is
possible that the evidence produced at trial legitimately reflects a
particular inference, even if that inference is, in actuality, false. So,
when defense counsel states, “The evidence demonstrates that the
police officer could not see the firearm on a dark street with poor
lighting conditions,” or “The evidence reflects that Officer Drebin
planted that gun on my client,” these are legitimate inferences that can
be drawn from the evidence. Therefore, these are true statements,
despite the fact that it may not have been what actually happened, or
the fact finder may choose to believe otherwise. After all, it can be
argued that the evidence does indeed demonstrate that a person would
have difficulty seeing the handle of a gun on a dark street from fortyfive feet away. Further, because of the officer’s motive to fabricate,
coupled with questions regarding the lighting conditions and the heavy
gun being held in the elastic waistband of the defendant’s sweatpants, an
argument can be made that the evidence also reflects that the officer
planted the gun to justify the shooting (even if in actuality this is not the
case).
Second, while the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing
arguments entail defense counsel stringing together a series of true facts
in order to draw false inferences, the history of Model Rule 3.3 indicates
that the rule itself was not intended to construe this type of potentially
misleading argument as a false statement.132 “An early draft of the
Model Rules would have created an explicit obligation for lawyers to
avoid creating misleading impressions through advocacy,” but this
prohibition was deliberately not incorporated into the current version of
the Model Rules.133
Lastly, in terms of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), no matter how misleading a
closing argument may be, a closing argument itself cannot be construed
as an affirmative act of offering false evidence. This is because the rules
132. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.3.4 (1986) (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1980)).
133. Id.
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of trial practice make clear that a closing argument is not itself
evidence.134
Model Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.”135 One could argue that attempting to convince the
jury of an alternative version of events that the lawyer knows to be false,
particularly when this alternative version of events involves implying
misconduct and untruthfulness on the part of another, constitutes
dishonesty or misrepresentation. While once again evidencing the
vagueness of the Model Rules, the rule itself fails to define whether its
application extends to cross-examination or closing argument.136
However, it does not appear that lawyers are disciplined under Model
Rule 8.4(c) for arguing false inferences, so long as they are based on
true facts.137 As Professor Ellen Yankiver Suni has noted, “It seems
likely that . . . what is within the range of appropriate litigation conduct
in criminal cases are incorporated into the interpretation of this
Rule.”138
Restatement section 120 uses language very similar to that of Model
Rule 3.3 in prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of fact or
offering false evidence.139 For the same reasons as those noted above,
the carefully worded false-implication and evidence-reflects closing
arguments contain no false statements of fact and do not involve the
134. The jury instruction in the Third Circuit is representative of the typical jury
instruction addressing this point. THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL,
§ 1.08 (2009). This particular provision of the Third Circuit jury instruction addressing closing
argument reads in pertinent part, “The evidence from which you are to find the facts consists
of the following: (1) The testimony of the witnesses . . . . The following are not evidence: (1)
Statements and arguments of the lawyers for the parties in this case . . . .” Id.; see also
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3:3:208 (2d ed. Supp.
1998) (positing that “false evidence” in Model Rule 3.3 relates only to perjury and not to false
implications from true facts).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
136. Id.
137. Suni, supra note 9, at 1663 n.91.
138. Id.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) reads in relevant part,
A lawyer may not: (a) knowingly counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely or
otherwise to offer false evidence; (b) knowingly make a false statement of fact to the
tribunal; (c) offer testimony or other evidence as to an issue of fact known by the
lawyer to be false.
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lawyer offering any false evidence. In terms of the misleading argument
fashioned out of the witness’s truthful testimony, the comment to
section 120 notes that “[a] lawyer may make conditional or
suppositional statements so long as they are so identified and are neither
known to be false nor made without a reasonable basis in fact for their
conditional or suppositional character.”140 Professor Suni has further
noted that the commentary to this section “supports the application”
that Restatement section 120 was intended to apply “only to actual false
evidence and false statements and not generally to false implications
from true facts.”141
ABA Standard 4-7.7 regulates defense attorney conduct during
closing argument. ABA Standard 4-7.7 states, “In closing argument to
the jury, defense counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in the record. Defense counsel should not intentionally
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw.”142 For example, in the Cassidy case, even though Officer Drebin
testified truthfully, defense counsel’s suggestions, made in both the
false-implication and evidence-reflects closing arguments, are all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. When the
lawyer argues that Officer Drebin’s testimony is incredible because he
could not see a gun in the dark lighting conditions, because the weight of
the gun was too much for the defendant to hold, and because Officer
Drebin had a motive to fabricate his testimony, these are all “reasonable
inferences” that could be drawn “from the evidence in the record.”143
Further, the comment to ABA Standard 4-7.7 sheds light on what
the standard means by “mislead[ing] the jury as to inferences it may
draw.”144 The comment to ABA Standard 4-7.7 notes that “[t]he
obligation to avoid misrepresentation is broad” and provides the

140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120, cmt. f, illus. 5
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
141. See Suni, supra note 9, at 1663. Professor Suni’s analysis relates to Restatement
section 180, which at the time of analysis was only in the draft stages. Id. at 1663 n.92.
Restatement section 120 is the current version of the old Restatement section 180. The
language of the draft version, as well as the commentary, is nearly identical to the current
version. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 180 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft. No. 8 1997).
142. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 4-7.7.
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following example of misleading the jury: “An argument to the jury that
the accused has a ‘clean record’ when counsel is aware of prior
convictions, although the evidence is silent, is an affirmative
misrepresentation of a fact.”145 This example suggests that the ABA
Standards’ view of misleading the jury as to inferences it may draw is
defined as explicit statements made by defense counsel that he knows to
be untrue, despite the fact that such an inference may find support in the
trial record itself. In this sense, ABA Standard 4-7.7 appears to draw a
parallel between itself and the reference to false statements contained in
Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) and the comment even cites to Model Rule
3.3(a)(1) in providing the above example.146 For reasons previously

145. Id. § 4-7.7 cmt.
146. Id. § 4-7.7 cmt. n.2. It should be noted that during the writing of this Article the
third edition of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function were in effect.
However, a fourth edition has been more recently released. As of this writing, the fourth
edition of the ABA Standards has not been released with commentary. In some capacity, this
makes it difficult to ascertain the true extent and meaning of each new or revised standard.
With this in mind, the fourth edition has added the following standard: ABA Standard 4-1.4
Defense Counsel’s Tempered Duty of Candor, which states:
(b) Defense counsel should not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law or
offer false evidence, to a court, lawyer, witnesses, or third party. It is not a false
statement for defense counsel to suggest inferences that may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence.
In addition, while acting to accommodate legitimate
confidentiality, privilege, or other defense concerns, defense counsel should correct
a defense representation of material fact or law that defense counsel knows is, or
later learns was, false.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourth
Edition.html [perma.cc/GN76-DX2Z].
Further, ABA Standard 4-7.7 has been modified and renumbered as ABA Standard 47.8. This standard reads in relevant part:
(a) In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), defense
counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
Defense counsel should, to the extent time permits, review the evidence in the
record before presenting closing argument. Defense counsel should not knowingly
misstate the evidence in the record, or argue inferences that counsel knows have no
good-faith support in the record.
Id. Again, the full meaning of these standards can be better understood when they are fully
released with commentary. However, for the purposes of the instant discussion, it seems
unlikely that the addition of ABA Standard 4-1.4 and the revisions contained in ABA
Standard 4-7.8 are intended to materially change the third edition’s prohibition on misleading
the jury through the use of explicitly false statements during closing argument—as doing so
would place the ABA’s Standards of Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense
Function in sharp contrast to the ethical prohibitions against making false statements
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noted in discussing Model Rule 3.3,147 both closing arguments contain
true statements and therefore do not violate the misleading the jury
provision of ABA Standard 4-7.7.
d. The False-Story Closing Argument Is Unethical
Unlike the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing arguments,
the false-story closing argument more strongly presents the defense
theory in story form through a series of affirmative statements that
defense counsel knows to be untrue.148 For example, unqualified
statements such as, “My client is innocent”; “Here’s what really
happened”; “Officer Drebin is lying”; or “After he realized my client
never had a gun in the first place, Police Officer Drebin planted the gun
on my client,” are obviously not true as defense counsel knows that the
version of events he is telling the jury is not what happened and that his
client did in fact have a gun on his person. The entire false-story
argument is premised on presenting an alternative version of events in
which defense counsel explicitly asserts the truth of those alternatives,
knowing them to be false.
In assessing whether this type of closing argument is ethical, the
false-story closing argument does not appear to violate Model Rule
3.4(e) or Restatement section 107 and the prohibition against alluding
“to any matter . . . that will not be supported by admissible evidence.”149
In a technical sense, while the defense attorney may know the closing
argument is based on untruths, each inference he is asking the jury to
draw does, to the outside observer, appear to literally be supported by
admissible evidence.
For example, when the defense attorney
affirmatively tells the jury that Officer Drebin planted the gun to avoid
being fired, that inference is supported by the fact that the evidence on
the record shows that Internal Affairs told Officer Drebin that one more
unjustified shooting and his employment would be terminated.
However, the false-story closing argument is unethical because of
the manner in which these inferences are phrased and presented to the
jury. As detailed above, Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), Restatement section 120
and ABA Standard 4-7.7 all prohibit defense counsel from making false
contained in Rule 3.3 (a)(1) of the ABA’s own Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
147. Supra Part III.A.2.a.
148. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344.
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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statements to the judge or jury.150 For example, in addressing the
specific issue of the defense counsel’s explicit statement that the client is
innocent, one legal commentator has stated, “In closing argument,
because Rule 3.3 states that ‘[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal,’ it would seem that a lawyer
who knows her client is guilty cannot explicitly claim that he is
innocent.”151 However, in addition to explicitly stating the client’s
innocence, the false-story closing argument presented above involves a
host of other explicit statements the trial attorney knows to be untrue.
Because the telling of this false story is based on a series of knowingly
false statements, the structure of this type of closing argument violates
each of the three ethical provisions identified above.152
Moreover, because the false-story closing argument clearly violates
Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), it likely violates Model Rule 8.4(c) and its
prohibition against engaging in conduct that involves “dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”153 This is also true of Model Rule 8.4(d),
which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.154 A violation of Rule 3.3(a) may be prejudicial to the
administration of justice in that a lawyer’s dishonesty “may cause the
public to lose confidence in both lawyers and the judicial system as a
whole.”155 Indeed, numerous decisions have held that a lawyer who
violates Model Rule 3.3(a) generally violates both 8.4(c) and (d).156
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
151. K. Craig Welkener, Note, Possible but Not Easy: Living the Virtues and Defending
the Guilty, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1088 (2013) (alteration in original).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993); see also supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (indicating
that ABA Standard 4-7.7 and its prohibition against misleading the jury as to inferences it
may draw, references Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) and indicates that “an affirmative
misrepresentation of a fact” is one in which defense counsel makes an explicit representation
to the jury that they know to be untrue despite the fact such an inference could be drawn
from the trial record).
153. Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and
Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 3, 28 (2002) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)).
154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
155. Richmond, supra note 153, at 28–29.
156. See, e.g., In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 980 (Ariz. 1995) (censuring lawyers who are not
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C. A Normative Critique of the Ethical Rules As Applied to Discrediting
the Truthful Witness
1. How to Ethically Discredit the Truthful Witness
The above exploration of existing ethical rules and standards makes
clear that there is a perfectly ethical way in which to advance a false
defense by discrediting the truthful witness on both cross-examination
and closing argument. This can be done without running afoul of any
existing ethical rules or standards by combining the true-facts crossexamination and the false-implication or evidence-reflects closing
arguments. Of these two types of closing arguments, criminal defense
attorneys can decide whether the false-implication or evidence-reflects
type of closing argument is the most effective type of closing argument
based on their own personal style and opinion.
For the reasons previously detailed, cross-examination that is
designed to only elicit truthful responses from the witness, even if those
responses may later be used to create a false impression during closing
argument, will not violate the good faith basis rule that is at the core of
the ethical guidelines regulating cross-examination.157 Further, a closing
argument that asks the jury to draw false inferences from true facts is
ethically permissible so long as the attorney never explicitly makes a
false statement of fact.158
2. Current Ethics Rules Reflect a Reasonable Compromise Between
Competing Values
That the combinations of the ethical techniques described above,
which allow for the truthful witness to be discredited without actually
lying to the jury, happens to be ethically permissible is not surprising.159

honest with settlement judge for violating Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c)); In re Hansen, 877 P.2d
802, 804–06 (Ariz. 1994) (lawyer who lied to court about reason for witness’s absence
violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); People v. Reed, 955 P.2d 65, 67–68 (Colo.
1998) (suspending lawyer who forged another lawyer’s signature on court documents
pursuant to Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 731
A.2d 447, 456–57 (Md. 1999) (holding that a lawyer who lied in deposition and lied to the
judge violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)).
157. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
158. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
159. It is worth noting that a certain inconsistency exists in terms of how current ethics
rules allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited in the course of arguing false implications.
A criminal defense attorney is required to ask questions that are premised on a good faith
basis, yet with certain limitations, he can make closing arguments that are not supported by
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For reasons further explained in this section, the combination of the
true-facts cross-examination and these two types of closing arguments as
a means of discrediting the truthful witness is consistent with the
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the weight of the
state’s evidence,160 as well as the truth-seeking function of a criminal
trial161 and the lawyer’s corresponding obligation of candor to the
tribunal.162 In this sense, the construction of current ethics rules in the
context of discrediting the truthful witness represent a sound and
reasonable balance between these competing interests.
Indeed, the American criminal justice system is defined by differing
goals, which at times are in tension with each other. For the purposes of
the instant discussion, there are two competing goals worth noting. The
first goal relates to the criminal justice system’s search for the truth.163
However, this goal can at times be in tension with a second goal of the
criminal justice system—the goal of protecting the innocent, even if that
means vigorously defending the guilty and in the process obscuring the
truth.164
The question of whether the central purpose of a criminal trial is to
seek the truth is one that has pointedly divided legal scholars.165 Some
the same good faith basis and that he may know to be affirmatively false. However, this
inconsistency can be explained in relation to the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.
As noted previously, the good faith basis requirement for questions asked on crossexamination is not a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront their accuser.
See United States v. Beck, 625 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the criminal defendant
does have a constitutional right to challenge the weight of the evidence presented by the state
at closing argument—even if that means arguing a false implication from true facts. The
contours of this constitutional right are explained in greater detail in this section.
160. See supra note 15 (defining what is meant by the term weight of the evidence); see
also Subin, supra note 27 (noting the defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the state’s
evidence). This point will also be greatly expanded upon in this section.
161. David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert
Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494 (1992) (noting that
of the goals that the criminal justice system is designed to promote “one goal emerges as
preeminent: finding the truth”).
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
163. Harris, supra note 161, at 494.
164. Id. at 496–97 (“Note that the goal of protecting the innocent may exist in tension
with the goal of truth finding.”).
165. See Kenneth W. Starr, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 901, 902–
903 (1999). Starr describes a 1997 debate at Yale Law School between Professor Alan
Dershowitz and Akhil Reed Amar. Id. Professor Dershowitiz argued that truth is an
occasional byproduct of our criminal justice system, but not a goal in its own right. Id. 902–
03. Professor Amar argued that truth is intended to the paramount objective of the criminal
justice system. Id. at 903.
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scholars contend that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system
is to search for the truth.166 These scholars find support for this position
in noting the development of rules of procedure, substantive law, and
rules of evidence (with the exception of excluding evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional rights and evidentiary privileges), which they
contend are primarily designed to advance the search for the truth.167
Despite this fact, the criminal justice system does endeavor to
promote other non-truth related goals.168 As noted previously,169 one of
these competing goals relates directly to protecting the innocent, which
paradoxically can be achieved by zealously defending the guilty and, in
the process, undermining the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial.170
The argument that zealous defense of the guilty protects the factually
innocent is premised on the belief that if the prosecutor knows that the
defense attorney will vigorously attack the government’s case, the
prosecutor will either be unwilling to bring weak cases to trial in which
the defendant may be innocent, or will alternatively seek the strongest
evidence possible in order to ensure the accuracy of a guilty verdict.171

166. See Harris, supra note 161, at 494.
167. See Starr, supra note 165, at 903; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (4th
ed. 1992) (“The overwhelming majority of all rules of evidence have as their ultimate
justification some tendency to promote the objectives set forward in the conventional witness’
oath, the presentation of ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.’”).
168. See Harris, supra note 161, at 494–503. These goals include protecting the
innocent, respecting individual dignity, equal justice, and maintenance of an accusatorial
system. Id.
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in
part, concurring in part) (“Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put
the State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he
thinks or knows to be the truth.”); see also Harris, supra note 161, at 496 (noting that in
defending the guilty we “seek to minimize the chances of the erroneous conviction of an
innocent person, even at the price of a greater chance that a jury may acquit a guilty person”).
171. See Subin, supra note 1, at 148–49; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 347 (“By
pushing hard in every case (whether the client is factually guilty or not) and thereby raising
‘reasonable doubts’ in the prosecution’s case whenever possible, the defense attorney helps
‘make the screens work’ and thus protects the interests of the factually innocent.”). It should
be noted the above justifications relate only to vigorously defending the guilty. The
importance of challenging the state’s case when the defendant insists on his innocence is that
in vigorously confronting the accusation made against the accused, the truth can ultimately be
exposed and the innocent protected from undue punishment. Perhaps this logic is best
articulated in this well-known maxim: “cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.’” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). Of course, rarely are those who insist on
defending the innocent asked to justify such actions for obvious reasons.
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While rules of procedure, substantive law, and evidentiary rules may
be designed to further the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial, the
goal of protecting the innocent at the expense of punishing the guilty,
even to the detriment of the truth, is enshrined in the Constitution
itself.172
First, the Constitution dictates that government is required to meet
the high burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, even if
that means that a guilty defendant may go free, in order to ensure that
an innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted.173 Second, the
defendant is given the right to actively participate in the trial process by
challenging the weight of the state’s evidence in order to convince the
fact finder that the state has not met this burden.174 Importantly, this
constitutional right is extended in equal measure to the guilty and
innocent alike.175 The criminal defendant’s right to actively challenge
the weight of the state’s evidence, specifically on cross-examination and

172. See Harris, supra note 161, at 496–97 (noting that, in addition to the proof beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, “[a] number of rules of constitutional dimension protect the
innocent”). This Article offers its own analysis of what those other constitutional dimensions
are in greater detail in this section.
173. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (“[T]he prosecution must bear the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt ‘the existence of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged.’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). “The
reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.
It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. The Winship Court further held that the
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that
the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
Id. at 364; see also Harris, supra note 161, at 496 (noting that the reasonable doubt standard
reflects our “fundamental value determination” that “it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
174. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344 (“Under our constitutional system, I do not need to
try to convince the factfinder about the truth of any factual propositions. I need only try to
convince the factfinder that the prosecution has not met its burden.”).
175. Wade, 388 U.S. at 256–57 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(“[Defense counsel] must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent,
but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is
innocent or guilty.”); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e
agree that defense counsel should represent his client vigorously, regardless of counsel’s view
of guilt or innocence . . . .”).
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closing argument, is found in two separate, but related, aspects of the
Sixth Amendment.176
The first of these rights is the right to confront one’s accuser through
the use of cross-examination.177 As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Davis v. Alaska,178 “Cross-examination is the principal means
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested.”179 The Davis Court went on to note that “the cross-examiner is
not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’
perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been
allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”180
The second of these Sixth Amendment rights relates to the
defendant’s ability to challenge the strength of the state’s case at closing
argument, which has generally been found within the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel.181 The right to be heard at closing
argument further allows defense counsel to argue all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence contained in the trial
record.182
Therefore, because the above rights are constitutional mandates, the
guilty defendant’s right to challenge the weight of the state’s evidence
must be incorporated into existing ethics rules.183 As noted by the

176. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 121, 160 and accompanying text.
177. The Confrontation Clause found within the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
178. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
179. Id. at 316. Of course, there are reasonable limits placed on the right of crossexamination. For the purposes of the instant discussion, see supra note 159 (noting that the
requirement that one have good faith basis for questions asked on cross-examination does not
violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation).
180. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
181. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860 (1975) (“The Constitutional right of a
defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make
a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however simple, clear,
unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem . . . .” (quoting Yopps v. State 178 A.2d
880 (Md. 1962))).
182. See Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 468 (Fla. 2004) (“Closing argument presents
an opportunity for both the State and the defendant to argue all reasonable inferences that
might be drawn from the evidence.”).
183. The United States Supreme Court has previously invalidated state rules of
professional conduct that unduly restricted a constitutional right. Notably this occurred in the
Court’s landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), where the
Court held that blanket state prohibitions contained in Arizona’s attorney discipline rules on
lawyer advertising were unconstitutional violations of free speech.
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drafters of the Model Rules themselves, the construction of the Model
Rules reflects the “constitutional principle that the state must prove
every element of the crime charged and may not, by procedural rule or
otherwise, shift its burden to the defendant.”184 For its part, Model Rule
3.1, relating to frivolous legal arguments, provides that, even if counsel
knows his client is guilty, “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal
proceeding . . . may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established.”185 Restatement section
110 uses virtually identical language to Model Rule 3.1.186
While the ABA Standards do not directly address defense counsel’s
role in requiring that the state prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt,187 ABA Standard 4-7.6, relating to cross-examination,
cites approvingly to Justice White’s often quoted opinion in United
States v. Wade188 in which he states that defense counsel may test the
quality of the prosecution’s evidence on cross-examination even if the
defense attorney knows his client is guilty and the witness has testified
truthfully.189 Justice White famously wrote of the defense lawyer:
If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his
normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent
permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State’s
case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or
knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which
defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense

184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000). The commentary to this section notes:
[A] lawyer defending a person accused of a crime, even if convinced that the guilt of
the offense charged can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, may require the
prosecution to prove every element of the offense, including those facts as to which
the lawyer knows the accused can present no effective defense.
Id. § 110 cmt. f.
187. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
188. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
189. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-7.6 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 257–58 (White, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part)).
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counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach
him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just
as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In
this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part
of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we
countenance or require conduct which in many instances has
little, if any, relation to the search for truth.190
The example provided in this Article demonstrates how existing
ethics rules must allow defense counsel to challenge the weight of the
evidence by discrediting the truthful witness and arguing a false defense.
After all, doing so is a constitutional right.191
In Commonwealth v. Cassidy, the evidence presented by the State is
legally sufficient in that, if the police officer’s testimony is believed, it
proves every element of the crime charged.192 The defense attorney
knows his client is guilty and the defendant insists on a trial and will not
testify. Because the evidence is legally sufficient if believed, the only
possible theory of defense is to convince the fact finder that the officer’s
testimony is not worthy of belief.
However, this cannot be done through the false-story crossexamination and false-story closing arguments because they are ethically
prohibited.193 Further, the defendant would not prevail on a claim that
he had a constitutional right to an attorney who makes knowingly false
statements of fact to the jury.194 Therefore, if the defense attorney could
not attack the weight of the state’s evidence—by eliciting only truthful
answers on cross-examination and then arguing that the jury should
draw certain inferences based only on defense counsel’s true
statements—the defense attorney would have no way of challenging the
weight of the prosecution’s evidence once he knows his client is guilty.
Such a predicament would be inconsistent with the long held
constitutional principle that even the guilty defendant is entitled to force
the state to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a

190. Wade, 388 U.S. at 257–58 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(footnotes omitted).
191. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344.
192. For the difference between sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence,
see supra note 15.
193. See supra Part III.B.2.b, d.
194. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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reasonable doubt195 and that in doing so defense counsel may, in the
Justice White’s famous words, attempt to put the “State’s case in the
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the
truth.”196
Additionally, attacking the credibility or accuracy of a truthful
witness is not only ethically permitted using the techniques
demonstrated in this Article, in some instances, it is even ethically
required.197 When challenging the weight of the evidence by discrediting
the truthful witness is the best or the only possible defense, the
prevailing view is that defense counsel is ethically required to do so in
order to fulfill the obligation of zealous advocacy owed to one’s client.198
However, current ethics rules do more than simply reflect the
defendant’s constitutional rights to challenge the quality of the state’s
evidence by discrediting the truthful witness.199 These rules are also
designed to further the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial that is
reflected in the development of substantive criminal law, rules of
195. Wade, 388 U.S. at 256–58 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
196. Id. at 258.
197. See Henning, supra note 8, at 271.
198. Id. (“The duty of zealous representation calls for the attorney to use all legal
means to obtain a favorable outcome for the client, which can include using tactics that lead a
jury to conclude mistakenly that the person is not guilty of the offense, because the
government has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To achieve that
result, the defense lawyer may try to have the jury draw a false inference, perhaps by calling
into question a witness’s credibility or by convincing the jury of an alternate theory of what
actually happened—or why—that precludes a finding of guilt.”); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). A previous formulation of the ABA’s ethics
code described an attorney’s obligation to his client by using the phrase “zealous advocacy” in
Canon 7. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1979);
George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1998, at 31.
However, in the most recent formulation, Canon 7 has been replaced with Model Rule 1.3,
which replaced the word “zealous” with the word “diligence.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). Nevertheless, it is common practice for attorneys to
refer to the obligation to zealously represent their clients. In all likelihood this is because far
from truly abandoning the concept of zealous advocacy, four references are made to the
concept of zeal in the preamble, commentary, and legal background material within the
overall text of the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope, r. 1.3
cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
Further, while beyond the scope of this particular Article, it is worth noting that in such a
predicament, defense counsel’s failure to challenge the weight of the evidence by discrediting
the truthful witness may not only violate the ethical obligation of diligent or zealous
advocacy, it might also represent a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.
199. See Henning, supra note 8, at 210 (“The regulations for lawyers must deal with
every type of legal representation, and not simply when a lawyer stands up in court.”).
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procedure, and rules of evidence.200 Ethics rules accomplish this task by
mandating that the lawyer is an officer of the court and, therefore, must
exercise candor in his dealings with the judge and jury.201 Therefore, in
his role as an officer of the court, the lawyer’s responsibilities in
defending his client cannot be entirely divorced from the truth-seeking
function of a criminal trial.202
Presumably, ethics rules could be written to expressly allow
attorneys to ask questions on cross-examination in the absence of a
good faith basis and to likewise make false statements to the tribunal
during closing argument. Constitutional concerns dictate only that
ethics rules be written in such a way as to ensure that the defendant is
able to force the government to prove every element of its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.203 Consistent with this constitutional dictate, even
the guilty defendant must be allowed to challenge the weight of the
state’s evidence.204 While the defendant has no constitutional right to
have his lawyer knowingly lie to the jury,205 or to ask questions in the
absence of a good faith basis,206 if ethics rules expressly allowed for such,
the defendant’s constitutional rights would not be harmed. The criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated when the defendant is
given more robust means to challenge the state’s case than required by
law.207
200. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
201. See Angela Dawson Terry, Note, What’s a Lawyer to Do?: The Tension Between
Zealous Advocacy and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
357, 359 (1997) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983))
(“The primary characteristic of the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court is the duty to
subordinate the interests of the client and the interests of the lawyer to the interests of the
judicial system and the public.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. &
scope, r. 3.3(a)(3) cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
202. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1470 (“The attorney is indeed an officer of the
court, and he does participate in a search for the truth.”); see also Henning, supra note 8, at
211.
203. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
204. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
205. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
206. State v. Marble, 901 P.2d 521, 524 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); see also United States v.
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
207. See Kimberly S. Keller, Privacy Lost: Comparing the Attenuation of Texas’s Article
I, Section 9 and the Fourth Amendment, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 429, 430 & n.3 (2003) (“The
federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights” and that state’s may provide their
citizens with greater rights (quoting Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App.
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But current ethics rules are obviously not written in such a way,208
and need not be. Instead, these rules constrain the means by which
criminal defense attorneys undermine the search for the truth and, in
the process, reflect the relevance of the truth-seeking function of a
criminal trial and the lawyer’s related obligation of candor to the
tribunal.
To that end, current ethics rules endeavor to strike a balance
between the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial and the
defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the weight of the state’s
evidence by arguing a false defense. That balance can best be summed
up in the following manner: Lawyers are not required to search for the
truth and at times may actively work to obscure its discovery, but they
cannot do so by telling lies.209 In this regard, current ethics rules
undoubtedly reflect a fair and reasonable compromise between the
important competing goals and interests that define the contours of the
American system of criminal justice identified above.
3. Arguments Against the Balance Reflected in Current Ethics Rules
It should be noted that not all scholars so readily embrace the
balance current ethics rules intelligently reflect.210 It may be suggested
that legitimate and important justifications exist for allowing defense
attorneys to argue a false defense without regard to the good faith
nature of the questions being asked on cross-examination and in
particular for eliminating the requirement that defense counsel not
make false statements during closing argument. However, an analysis of
these arguments demonstrates that they are ultimately unpersuasive.
To that end, some may contend that ethics rules that require
different forms of rhetoric on cross-examination and closing argument
when the client has confessed his guilt punish the client for being honest

1991))). As explained previously, ethics rules, while largely based on a version of the ABA’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are enacted by individual states. See supra note 106.
Therefore, federal constitutional concerns are implicated only when a state’s ethics code
otherwise restricts rights that are provided for in the Constitution, not when a state provides
an individual with more expanded rights pursuant to state law.
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
209. This description of defense counsels duel role as an advocate on behalf of the
guilty and as an officer of the court exemplifies one scholar’s observation that the “art” of the
advocate is “the art of misleading an audience without telling lies.” C.P. HARVEY, THE
ADVOCATE’S DEVIL 1–2 (1958).
210. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–43.
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with his lawyer.211 This point is worth noting in light of the fact that the
proceeding section of this Article posits that attorneys frequently adopt
unethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument because they
tend to be more effective from a trial advocacy standpoint.212
It follows that if the defendant knows that his lawyer must use a less
effective form of trial advocacy once he has confessed his guilt, the
defendant would be discouraged from being open and forthright with his
lawyer. Not only would this punish the client for being honest with his
lawyer, it would also cut against the client’s interests because it might
deprive counsel of favorable information and prevent the lawyer from
being fully prepared to address the introduction of unfavorable
evidence.213
However, the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside214 rejected the
validity of these arguments when it held that the defendant suffered no
legally cognizable harm when his lawyer threatened to expose his false
testimony.215 In drawing a parallel between the issue of punishing the
client by threating to expose his false testimony and placing limits on the
means by which the truthful witness is discredited, Professor Murray L.
Schwartz has argued, “It is hard to see why the client should fare any
better with respect to impeachment of a truthful witness if the lawyer’s
knowledge of the truthfulness of that testimony is based substantially, if
not wholly, upon the client’s disclosure.”216
Further, it may be suggested that restricting or requiring the use of
certain words or phrases based upon whether the defendant confessed
his guilt to his lawyer poses the practical problem of potentially
signaling to the fact finder during closing argument that the defendant is
guilty. For example, the lawyer’s failure to directly state that the client
is actually innocent may signal to a knowledgeable fact finder that the
defense attorney knows his client is guilty because the defense attorney
chose to either preface that statement with qualifying language, or chose
to state that the client was only “not guilty.” While concern regarding
linguistic signaling may be most acute in the context of explicitly stating
the client’s innocence, it may be suggested that in any given case the use
211. Id.
212. See supra Part IV.A.1, 2.
213. Scholars have made a similar point specifically in the context of preventing client
perjury. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1141.
214. 457 U.S. 157 (1986).
215. Id. at 161, 176.
216. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–41.
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of qualifying language in the evidence-reflects closing argument, or
argument by implication in the false-implication closing argument, may
potentially signal to the knowledgeable fact finder that defense counsel
is aware of his client’s guilt.
However, in other aspects of the trial process precedent exists for
advancing ethical considerations over concerns regarding how a jury
might interpret defense counsel’s specific advocacy techniques. An
example of this paradigm can be found once again in the context of
client perjury, specifically in the narrative approach to the use of
perjured testimony. Under this approach, in order for the lawyer to
avoid condoning perjury, when the lawyer knows the client will present
perjured testimony, the client is called to the witness stand and allowed
to testify in narrative form.217 The lawyer is then prohibited from
arguing during closing argument those portions of the defendant’s
testimony that they know to be perjured.218 However, it is understood
that the awkward presentation of the defendant’s testimony, as well as
defense’s counsel’s failure to argue such testimony, may send a signal
that the testimony is not truthful and the defendant’s protestations of
innocence are not to be believed.219
Regardless of this concern, the use of the narrative approach to
potential client perjury enjoys widespread use.220 And, once again, as
noted above, legal commentators have posited there is little compelling
reason why ethical concerns in the context of client perjury should be
treated differently than ethical concerns that may arise in the context of
discrediting the truthful witness.221
It may also be suggested that, in allowing for truthful witnesses to be
discredited while constraining the type of language used during closing
argument, current ethics rules place undue emphasis on linguistic

217. See Raymond J. McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal Defendant: It’s All
About the Lawyer, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1575, 1623–25 (2012).
218. Id. at 1623.
219. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978) (observing that a
knowledgeable judge or juror might infer from counsel’s minimal involvement in the
presentation of the defendant’s testimony that counsel did not believe the witness); Patrick R.
Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The Defendant’s
Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1985) (arguing that the narrative approach “signals
to the jury the lawyer’s disbelief of his or her client’s testimony.”). Regardless of this
concern, the use of the narrative approach to potential client perjury enjoys widespread use.
McKoski, supra note 217, at 1624.
220. McKoski, supra note 217, at 1624.
221. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–41.
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precision. In other words, because ethics rules still allow for attorneys
to argue false defenses, requiring that they do so through carefully
crafted rhetoric unnecessarily promotes form over substance.
However, emphasis on the use of carefully crafted language is a
necessary component of maintaining the proper balance between the
defendant’s right to argue a false defense and the defense attorney’s role
as an officer of the court. In this regard, scholars have recognized that
the subtle differences in the rhetoric that may be used to argue the same
false defense represents the dividing line between an appropriate
challenge to the prosecution’s case and an inappropriate
misrepresentation.222
Moreover, the alternative, i.e., giving criminal defense attorneys the
express right to make false statements of fact, would not only disturb
this important balance, it would prove untenable. In the eyes of many,
lawyers are already untrustworthy and the legal profession is one of low
moral and ethical standards. In fact,
[t]he popular image is that lawyers, and trial lawyers in
particular, are cunning deceivers and misleaders, flimflam artists
who use sly rhetorical skills to bamboozle witnesses, turning
night into day. In this conception, lawyers tell stories only in
order to seduce and beguile the hapless jurors who fall prey to
the advocate’s tricks.223
If ethics rules were written in such a way that lawyers could ask
questions in the absence of a good faith basis or make explicit
statements during closing argument that the lawyer knew to be untrue,
the standing of the legal profession would suffer even more dramatically
and such rules would further undermine public confidence in the
profession as a whole.
IV. THE (LIMITED) POTENTIAL TO CURB UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
A. Understanding the Persistence of Unethical Techniques
Despite the fact that the truthful witness can be discredited through
entirely ethical means, courtroom observers have noted that criminal

222. E.g., Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1064–65.
223. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T,
CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 1 (2001).
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defense attorneys frequently employ what this Article has termed the
unethical false-story cross-examination and closing argument.224
To that end, one of the more frequent ethical abuses that occurs on
cross-examination is the use of the false-story cross-examination and its
heavy reliance on asking questions in the absence of a good faith
basis.225 In listing the common “tricks” employed by trial attorneys on
cross-examination, Professor Richard H. Underwood observes that
lawyers frequently ask questions despite the fact that “the lawyer has no
good faith basis for asking a question that is suggestive of improper
conduct by the witness. The lawyer simply invents an outrageous
scenario and presents it to the jury by way of question.”226 Another
commentator has referred to the type of cross-examination questions
that form the basis of the false-story cross-examination as “[o]ne of the
more insidious tools in the cross-examiner’s arsenal,”227 while noting
that, “[a]lthough we expect attorneys to adhere to the rules of evidence
and confine their strategies to the ethical boundaries of the rules, they
often bend the rules and stretch the strategies.”228
Further, Professor Harry I. Subin has described as “sanitized”
closing arguments in which defense counsel refuses to “‘assert’ that facts
known to him to be false are true.”229 (While Subin has not provided a
term for these types of closing arguments, this Article has termed them
the false-implication closing argument.) Professor Subin then went on

224. It should be noted that the author’s own experience as a practicing criminal
defense attorney with over a decade of experience further confirms the observations of the
legal commenters that are referenced in this section.
225. Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 113, 124–25 (1997); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination:
The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 373–75
(1990) (referring to cross-examination by innuendo as a frequently employed “dirty trick”);
Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 121 (1996)
(discussing common ethics violations that occur on cross-examination and referring to the
types of questions that form the basis of this Article’s characterization of the false story crossexamination as a “presumptuous cross-examination question”).
226. Underwood, supra note 225, at 124–25.
227. See Strier, supra note 225, at 120–21 (“During cross-examination, attorneys employ
a plethora of nasty and dirty tricks. Interrogated witnesses are to be pitied, for crossexamination questions ‘are loaded with unsupported insinuations of improper motives,
negligence, incompetence, perjury or, worse, suspicion of guilt of the crime for which the
defendant is on trial.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Rooney, 313 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Mass.
1974)).
228. Id. at 221.
229. Subin, supra note 27, at 691.
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to observe that this type of closing argument “is much more forthright
than those which most attorneys would give.”230
Why then do criminal defense attorneys employ the unethical false
story techniques to advance a false defense when ethical means are
available? There are several answers to this question. As discussed
below,231 these reasons range from effective trial advocacy and the
pressures and culture of criminal defense lawyering to the fact that it is
almost impossible to get caught.232
1. The Importance of Narrative Structure
As noted previously, a story or narrative is defined by two important
elements in that a story or narrative represents a purposefully ordered
sequence of events designed to achieve a particular goal that explains
these events by focusing on characters, their goals, and their struggles to
achieve their goals.233 However, it is not necessary in every case for the
defense theory to consist of an alternative story to the one being offered
by the prosecution.
For example, defense counsel may advance a false defense by
arguing only that the defendant was misidentified when he was
randomly picked out of a photo array. Or the defense attorney may
argue that the witness is not worthy of belief without offering an
alternative explanation to the one offered by the state. In both types of
scenarios, the defense theory is only that the evidence offered by the
prosecution is simply not strong enough to conclude, beyond a

230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. See infra Part IV.A.1–4.
232. There is also the possibility of an additional explanation. Using 105 Williams
College undergraduate students, researchers attempted to determine if “negative
presumptuous questions” impacted a witness’s credibility. See Kassin, supra note 225, at 375–
76. These questions were very similar to this Article’s descriptions of the false-story type of
questions asked on cross-examination in that the questions implied negative facts and sought
to damage the credibility of the witnesses through innuendo. Students read these questions in
a mock trial transcript. Id. at 375. The witnesses were a rape victim and a psychological
expert. Id. at 375, 380. The results of the study are inconclusive. Id. at 381. The negative
presumptuous questions did in fact have a negative impact on the expert witness’s credibility
but appeared to have no impact on the rape victim’s. Id. at 380–81. While the researchers
attempted to reconcile these results, they ultimately concluded that “[f]urther research is
needed, however, to determine the factors that moderate these results. Further research is
also needed to evaluate the extent to which our findings generalize to real juries.” Id. at 381.
Because of the inconclusive nature of these results, it is the author’s opinion that while worth
noting, further discussion of this study is not warranted in the body of this Article.
233. See Posner, supra note 80, at 738–39; supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.
From a trial advocacy perspective, these types of defenses represent a
one-dimensional challenge to the state’s case because they only suggest
the evidence alone is too weak to justify a conviction, without offering
the fact finder an alternative story.
These types of one-dimensional challenges can be advanced through
both ethical and unethical means. In this sense, the telling of a false
story is not the only unethical way to weaken the testimony of the state’s
truthful witness. Pursuant to this Article’s previous discussion,234 even if
defense counsel chooses not to tell the jury a story, it is still unethical for
the defense attorney to ask a question without a good faith basis, or to
explicitly tell the jury something he knew was false.
However, in order to comport with current ethics rules, the defense
attorney advancing a one-dimensional challenge to the state’s case in the
form of a false defense can use the ethical forms of cross-examination
and closing arguments described previously. Defense counsel need only
phrase his questions in such a way as to satisfy the good faith basis
requirement on cross-examination and during closing argument to avoid
explicitly telling the fact finder something is true that he knows to be
false.
Despite the fact that a one-dimensional challenge can be advanced
through both ethical and unethical means, the one-dimensional
challenge is not commonly employed.235 The reason for this is simple:
defense attorneys have long recognized that it is essential to tell the jury
a story and, therefore, infrequently launch one-dimensional attacks on
the prosecution’s evidence.236
This is because “[w]e are typically able to doubt an explanation only
when we are persuaded, at least provisionally, of an alternative
explanation. Thus, the effective defender cannot simply protest that the
prosecution has not made its case. Rather, she must introduce and
embellish plausible alternatives to the prosecutor’s explanations.”237 To
that end, narrative structures are a natural mode for understanding the
human experience.238 In fact, “[p]sychologists are moving towards the
234. See supra Part III.B.2.
235. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 27 (8th ed. 2010).
236. Id. (“Effective storytelling is the basis for much of what occurs during trial . . . .
Small wonder, then, that good trial lawyers are invariably good storytellers.”).
237. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1760
(1993).
238. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
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conclusion that all of our knowledge is contained in stories and in the
mechanisms to construct and retrieve them.”239
It is difficult to understate the importance of narrative in the context
of a criminal trial. Indeed, “[i]t is now widely accepted, and empirical
research demonstrates, that narrative plays an important role
throughout the entire trial process.”240 This is true for two primary
reasons.241
First, jurors organize and interpret the evidence presented at trial
into a story format.242 The process by which evidence is presented in a
typical criminal trial can be fragmented, often times being presented out
of logical order and accompanied by discussion concerning evidentiary
foundations that are themselves unrelated to the case.243 Because stories
are the most common form of communication, to better understand the
evidence presented at trial, jurors reduce that evidence into story
form.244 Story structure also helps jurors reduce the risk of information
overload “by making it possible to continuously organize and reorganize
large amounts of constantly changing evidence.”245 Researchers have
noted, “Stories provide useful structures: plot, characters, time frames,

14 LEGAL WRITING 53, 57 (2008); see also Jonathan K. Van Patten, Storytelling for Lawyers,
57 S.D. L. REV. 239, 239 & n.2 (2012) (noting that storytelling has an almost “primal”
relationship to the human condition). Van Patten supports his description of storytelling as
“primal” using a passage from Gerry Spence:
Of course it is all storytelling—nothing more. It is the experience of the tribe
around the fire, the primordial genes excited, listening . . . the shivers racing up your
back to the place where the scalp is made, and then the breathless climax, and the
sadness and the tears with the dying of the embers, and the silence.
Gerry L. Spence, How to Make a Complex Case Come Alive for a Jury, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1986,
at 62, 63.
239. Robbins, supra note 85, at 772.
240. John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party
Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (2007).
241. For an excellent discussion concerning why narrative plays such an important part
in the trial process, see id.
242. Id. at 1088.
243. John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for
Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 612 (2005).
244. Blume, supra note 240, at 1088 (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 164–68 (1981)).
245. Id.
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motives, and settings, which help jurors process and understand what is
otherwise complex and sometimes unfamiliar information.”246
Second, during deliberations, juries “re-story” the evidence
presented during the trial.247 In deciding who should win the case, jurors
tend to argue with one another in story format.248 What this means is
that trials are essentially story battles, with the side that tells the best
story being declared the victor.249
The above reasons explain why criminal defense attorneys choose
trial theories that revolve around storytelling and also explain, in part,
why trial attorneys gravitate toward the false-story techniques.
However, this Article’s example demonstrates that the ethical forms
of cross-examination and closing argument can also be used to tell the
same story as the false-story techniques. It should be noted that both
the ethical and unethical types of cross-examinations and closing
arguments can be designed to advance the same theory of defense—for
example, in Commonwealth v. Cassidy this theory of defense is that
Officer Drebin framed Quinton Cassidy. In both the ethical and
unethical sets of techniques, this theory is advanced in story form in that
it is presented as a purposefully ordered sequence of events and
explained from the perspective of Officer Drebin, the story’s main
character. In this sense, beyond simply a one-dimensional challenge,
ethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument can also be
used to advance a two-dimensional challenge, in that defense counsel
can use these techniques to argue not just that the prosecution’s
evidence is weak but also to imply an alternative story to the one being
presented by the State.
Despite this fact, defense attorneys infrequently use ethical forms of
cross-examination and closing argument when the defense theory
consists of an alternative story.250 This is because the false story
techniques represent a better way to tell the story than their ethical, but
not nearly as effective, storytelling counterparts.251
In his book, Storytelling for Lawyers, Professor Philip N. Meyer
noted, “[S]torytellers have understood for millennia, there is a powerful

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. (citing SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS 271 (2004)).
Id. at 1089.
SUNWOLF, supra note 246, at 272–80.
See Blume, supra note 240, at 1089.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Rideout, supra note 238, at 57; see also Blume, supra note 240, at 1090.
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and well-defined narrative architecture or structure in stories.”252
Professor Meyer suggests that the DNA of a story largely consists of five
interrelated components.253 In the best stories, these five components fit
together seamlessly.254 These components are: (1) Scene, (2) Cast and
Character, (3) Plot, (4) Time Frame, and (5) Human Plight.255
To that end, it may be difficult to tell that the true-facts crossexamination is telling any story at all. The questions may be asked in
such a way as to intimate the story of Quinton Cassidy being framed, but
the story is to some extent buried beneath all of the truthful answers.
This is especially clear when compared to the false-story crossexamination.256
The false-story cross-examination is principally
designed to tell the story of how the defendant was framed through the
questions defense counsel asks. The fact finder can easily discern the
alternative story and identify the five interrelated components of the
story from the questions alone. In fact, this is so much so that Officer
Drebin’s answers are basically irrelevant.
The role of narrative is also important with respect to the types of
closing arguments that are used to raise doubts about a witness’s
testimony. While the false-implication closing argument may be used to
tell a story, because the defense is constrained by making only
technically true statements, the story is more difficult to detect. After
all, it is only implied, not stated. Further, having to tell a story
frequently qualified by the language “the evidence reflects that” or “the
evidence demonstrates that” also hampers the trial attorney’s ability to
seamlessly integrate the five component pieces of a story together.
However, with respect to the false-story techniques, because the
defense attorney is willing to make statements he knows are not true, he
can tell the story of how the defendant was framed by easily fitting the
five components of effective storytelling together. He does this by

252. PHILIP N. MEYER, STORYTELLING FOR LAWYERS 3 (2014).
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. It is worth pointing out that it is not necessary to use the false-story crossexamination to advance a false story, although as pointed out in this section, this false-story
cross-examination is frequently used. However, a false story can be told by using the answers
elicited on the true-facts cross-examination and then using the false-story closing argument.
Some litigators may in fact prefer such a method. However, for the reasons previously
detailed in Part III of this Article, this would mean that half of their conduct was ethical and
half was not.
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telling the story in a way that most listeners would immediately grasp as
a story of the defendant’s innocence.
Additionally, because the false-story closing argument is not bound
by technically true statements, the trial attorney can tell the story using
not only stronger language but language that represents a more
authentic way of describing real human events. For example, the lawyer
can say, “Now let me tell you what really went down out there. Officer
Drebin can’t be believed when he says he saw my client with a gun. In
those dark lighting conditions, he couldn’t see anything.” If defense
counsel uses the false-implication closing argument, he can express the
same point, but in a less natural way. The lawyer must say something
like, “The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my
client possessed a firearm. To do so, you must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the police officer saw the firearm on a dark street, with poor
lighting conditions.” Moreover, in terms of the evidence-reflects type of
closing argument, it is not natural to tell stories by frequently qualifying
statements using legal sounding phrases such as “the evidence reflects,”
or the “the evidence demonstrates that.”
In light of the above observations, it is not surprising that the falsestory cross-examination and closing argument techniques are commonly
used to discredit the truthful witness.257 When criminal defense
attorneys choose trial theories, when possible, they choose to tell
stories.258 Therefore, it is also not surprising that when defense counsel
attempts to cast doubt on a witness’s testimony by presenting an
alternative story to the one offered by the prosecution (and the trial has
essentially been reduced to a story battle), defense counsel frequently
chooses the best storytelling techniques available.259
2. The Importance of Explicitly Stating That Your Client Is Innocent
Another important difference between the ethical forms of closing
arguments and the unethical false-story closing argument technique
relates to how the client’s innocence is presented to the fact finder.
Because the false-story technique disregards the ethical requirement of
making technically true statements, this technique allows the trial
attorney to tell the jury his client is innocent.260 This is a necessary
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra pp. 332–35.
See MEYER, supra note 252, at 2.
See id. at 3.
See Braccialarghe, supra note 57.
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component of the false story as the defendant’s innocence is deeply
woven into the fabric of the alternative explanation offered to the fact
finder.
However, with respect to the ethical false-implication closing
argument, the client’s innocence is only implied and, because defense
counsel will not say something they know to be explicitly untrue, the
jury is told that the state cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt and, therefore, the defendant is “not guilty.”261
Legal commentators have long suggested that, from the perspective
of sound trial advocacy, it is folly for the criminal defense attorney to
tell the jury his client is not guilty as opposed to actually innocent.262 In
1966, Professor Monroe H. Freedman observed,
Criminal defense lawyers do not win their cases by arguing
reasonable doubt. Effective trial advocacy requires that the
attorney’s every word, action and attitude be consistent with the
conclusion that his client is innocent. As every trial lawyer
knows, the jury is certain that the defense attorney knows
whether his client is guilty. The jury is therefore alert to, and will
be enormously affected by, any indication by the attorney that he
believes the defendant is guilty. Thus, the plea of not guilty
commits the advocate to a trial, including a closing argument, in
which he must argue that “not guilty” means “not guilty in fact.263
More recently, Ann Roan, articulated the difference between what
she calls “negative case analysis” and “building the positive case for
innocence.”264 Roan argues that a defense theory that is premised on
what the state cannot prove represents negative case analysis.265
However, she suggests defense theories in criminal cases should never
be framed in this way.266 Instead, she argues that every client should be
presented as innocent.267
261. See supra note 87 (noting the factual difference between a plea of not guilty and
the defendant being actually innocent of the crime with which he is charged); see also
Welkener, supra note 151, at 1088 (noting that stating a client is innocent when the defense
counsel knows otherwise violates Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)).
262. E.g., Freedman, supra note 2, at 1471–72.
263. Id.
264. Ann M. Roan, Building the Persuasive Case for Innocence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2011,
at 18, 19.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. As a result, she argues that every case can be fit into one of six categories of
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Roan suggests that juries perceive negative case analysis as a
combination of lawyer tricks and legal technicalities.268 In Roan’s view,
[w]hen a defense lawyer says, “The state cannot prove each and
every element beyond a reasonable doubt,” juries hear, “Ladies
and gentlemen, my client is guilty. Guilty, guilty, guilty. But
you’re going to let him go anyway. Why? Because of technical
legal mumbo-jumbo. That’s why.” No wonder lawyers lose
cases when they prepare them using a negative case analysis.269
It is true that the evidence-reflects type of closing argument allows
defense counsel to say, “The evidence reflects my client is innocent,” as
opposed to saying only that “My client is not guilty.” However, even
using this type of closing argument, defense counsel is not actually
telling the jury his client is innocent. Instead, every time the jury hears
his client is innocent that statement is accompanied by a qualifying
phrase such as “the evidence reflects that my client is innocent.” In this
regard, the observations of one trial attorney regarding effective closing
argument are worth noting: “The language in closing arguments is
entirely different from the ambiguity normally used by lawyers. The
lawyer can no longer afford to speak in alternatives or uncertainties. In
the closing argument, he must speak in absolutes. There must be no
doubting his position.”270
Ultimately, the observations of the above commentators plainly
capture the reasons why criminal defense attorneys choose to discredit
honest witnesses through the false-story closing argument technique.
Put simply, trial lawyers use the false-story technique because they can
tell the jury an actual story in which the client is innocent and the story
of their client’s innocence can be told most persuasively.271
innocence. These six categories are: (1) “It never happened (full denial)”; (2) “It happened, I
didn’t do it (e.g., mistaken identity)”; (3) “It happened, I did it, but it was not a crime (e.g.,
self-defense)”; (4) “It happened, I did it, it was a crime, but it was not this crime (lesser
offense)”; (5) “It happened, I did it, it was this crime, but I’m not responsible (e.g.,
entrapment; duress; choice of evils; insanity)”; and (6) “It happened, I did it, it was this crime,
and I’m responsible—so what?” Id. Interestingly, Roan’s article never addresses any of the
potential ethical implications of stating a defendant is innocent when defense counsel knows
this to be untrue.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. James H. Roberts, Jr., The SEC of Closing Arguments, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
203, 209 (1999).
271. It is worth noting that in the specific context of stating that the client is innocent,
the above argument essentially boils down to the concern that use of different rhetoric,
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3. The Culture of Criminal Defense Work
A legal scholar once noted, “One of the most difficult tasks of a
criminal defense attorney . . . is to determine ‘how far he may go’ in
addressing the court.”272 Admittedly, in the heat of battle, even for the
most ethically conscious trial attorneys, it may be difficult to avoid
crossing the fine line between zealous advocacy and personal
endorsement of facts known to be untrue.273 Because of the slight
differences in the techniques used to discredit the honest witness,
invariably even the most well-meaning attorney may inadvertently cross
over into in the unethical phrasing of questions or argument.
However, it is doubtful that once a criminal defense attorney has
decided to argue a false defense and discredit a truthful witness, he will
think much about the strictures of the numerous ethical provisions cited
in this Article when preparing cross-examination and closing
argument.274 Instead, when possible, he will choose to tell a false story
and not think much about it.275 The overarching reason for this is that
many criminal defense attorneys feel a special responsibility for their
client’s fate.276 It is not uncommon for the inspired criminal defense
attorney to feel as though he is “the final, and perhaps only, bulwark
between the client and the rest of the world.”277
In this regard, it is essential to note that the rules promulgated in
ethics codes generally fail to take into account the social contexts in
which professional decisions are made.278 In fact, some legal ethicists
depending upon whether the defendant confesses his guilt to his lawyer, poses the practical
problem of potentially signaling to the fact finder during closing argument that the defendant
is guilty. The ethical justification for prohibiting explicitly untrue statements referencing the
client’s innocence, despite the potential for linguistic signaling, was addressed in supra Part
III.C.2.
272. Harvey A. Schneider & Stephen D. Marks, The Contrasting Ethical Duties of the
Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Criminal Cases, 7 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 120, 131 (1975).
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 167 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 8 1997) (“It may be difficult in practice to maintain the
line between permissible zealous argument about facts and inferences to be drawn from them
and impermissible personal endorsement.”).
274. See Fritz Scheller, Cutting Bait, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 673, 673 (2010).
275. See id.
276. The famous criminal defense attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, once said, “I
protect my clients against criminal guilt; judgment I leave to the power of almighty God.”
BRIAN C. DRUMMOND, THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPARATION IN DEVELOPING A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE STRATEGY 89 (Aspatore 2010).
277. Scheller, supra note 274, at 673.
278. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to Be a Human Being and a
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posit that the root cause of professional misbehavior does not result
from lawyers being unaware of the applicable disciplinary rules or
because these rules are too difficult to understand,279 but rather because
of “rampant excesses of the ‘lawyering skills’ that every law student
manages to acquire—namely rationalization and denial—that leave
them either unable to discern their true ethical situation or unable to
conform their conduct to known standards of professional behavior.”280
With respect to the unethical means of casting doubt on the
testimony of honest witnesses by telling a false story, this rationalization
includes believing that whatever type of cross-examination or closing
argument is used, the theory of defense is still the same. It is not as if
the choice of techniques has the effect of casting the witness in the light
of either a saint or a sinner. In other words, the criminal defense
attorney has already passed his own personal Rubicon in which he has
no qualms about making the honest witness appear unsure of his
testimony or even made to look like a liar. Yet, exactly how defense
counsel chooses to discredit the truthful witness can impact the outcome
of the case.
Further, these rationalizations relate to the subtle differences
between the ethical and unethical techniques that can be used to make
the honest witness appear incredible. Admittedly, whether these
techniques are ethical or unethical turns on the subtle phrasing of
questions and carefully worded statements asking the jury to find
reasonable doubt. In light of the heavy responsibility criminal defense
attorneys feel, many have no difficulty justifying what they view as a
minor indiscretion in light of the fact that their client may be facing
significant consequences.281
Some defense attorneys may embrace the false-story techniques by
rationalizing that this particular indiscretion is extremely minor in light
of their view that prosecutors frequently engage in far worse unethical
behavior that is entirely inconsistent with achieving a just result.282

Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 505 (2003) (“Codes of ethics have typically ignored the social context
in which professional decisions are made.”).
279. Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 795.
280. Id. The same author posits that other reasons for unethical behavior relate to
other “individual pathologies” such as mental or emotional illness or substance abuse. Id.
281. See DRUMMOND, supra note 276, at 89.
282. For a complete discussion of one defense attorney’s view of the numerous unfair
and potentially unethical practices that prosecutors continually engage in, see Abbe Smith,
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Many defense attorneys may feel that the culture of the prosecutor’s
office has now come to reflect a “win-at-all-costs” mentality.283
Professor Abbe Smith provides the most compelling emotional example
of this point of view when observing, “There is a courthouse saying—
known by anyone who has ever practiced criminal law—that expresses
the ethos of winning over everything else in a grisly, sardonic way: ‘Any
prosecutor can convict the guilty. It takes real talent to convict the
innocent.’”284 The criminal defense attorney might reason, “So what if
the truthful witness is made to look untruthful. If the prosecution is
willing to convict an innocent person, then what’s the big deal if I
discredit a truthful witness by telling a false story as opposed to implying
one, or if I forget to state that ‘the evidence demonstrates’ before every
inference I ask the jury to draw.”
Moreover, some criminal defense attorneys might embrace the most
effective, but unethical, way of arguing a false defense for no other
reason than they too just want to win. Indeed, the win-at-all-costs
mentality is alive and well in the contemporary practice of law, and not
only at the prosecutor’s office.285 Criminal defense attorneys are
certainly not immune from this temptation. In her famous article
describing the different motivations that drive individuals to become
criminal defense attorneys, Professor Barbara Allen Babcock observed
that for some, ego is what drives their choice of profession.286 Referring
to these types of attorneys as the “egotist,” Professor Babcock notes,
“And winning, ah winning has great significance because the cards are

Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2001).
283. Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place
Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) (“The pressure to
bring and win cases has infiltrated the very culture of the prosecutor’s office. Prosecutors
may have once believed their role to be like that of a judge—to evaluate and determine when
it is fair to bring criminal charges or pursue a conviction. Now the primary purpose of the
prosecutor is to seek as many convictions as possible. In turn, the pressure to produce wins
has led to a ‘win-at-all-costs’ mentality, which pushes prosecutors toward misconduct as a
means to an end.”).
284. Smith, supra note 282, at 389.
285. See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE
AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 20–22 (1st ed. 1999) (positing
broadly that the contemporary practice of law has redefined what “truth and justice” mean in
representing clients). No longer does zealous representation entail a broad understanding of
what these words mean. Id. Instead, zealous advocacy has been turned into an “Adversary
Theorem,” which defines “Truth” and “Justice” as “win at any cost.” Id.
286. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 178
(1983–1984).
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stacked for the prosecutor. To win as an underdog, and to win when the
victory is clear—there is no appeal from a ‘Not Guilty’ verdict—is
sweet.”287
4. The Lack of Consequences
As this Article has shown, criminal defense attorneys choose to
discredit the honest witness through the unethical use of the false-story
techniques because telling a good story, using persuasive language, and
stating their client is actually innocence makes for the most effective
type of trial advocacy.288 Furthermore, the culture and pressures of
being a criminal defense attorney provide additional temptation to
eschew the selection of ethical trial techniques in the context of
discrediting the truthful witness.289
What undoubtedly enhances this temptation is the fact that, from a
practical standpoint, current ethics rules are completely unable to
prevent criminal defense attorneys from selecting these unethical
techniques.290 There are three reasons for this: (1) attorney-client
confidentiality/privilege and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in criminal cases,291 (2) the rules of trial practice,292 and (3)
the fact that defense attorney conduct at the trial level remains largely
unchecked because of the impossibility of the government’s appealing
the defendant’s acquittal.293
Ethical rules and standards are intended to be self-policing.294 If an
ethics rule prohibits an attorney from engaging in a certain type of
conduct, the attorney should voluntarily refrain from doing so.295
Whether the attorney would “get caught” or not is beside the point. If

287. Id. at 178.
288. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
289. See Scheller, supra note 274, at 674.
290. See infra Part IV.B.
291. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (noting
that with some exceptions not applicable to the current issue, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
292. See MAUET, supra note 235, at 255–58.
293. See Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1315 (1996).
294. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)
(“Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public
opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings.”).
295. Id.
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an attorney is unwilling to police himself at trial, the only way that
particular type of conduct can be curtailed is through an objection by
opposing counsel, either during cross-examination or closing
argument.296
If an attorney chooses the false-story type of cross-examination and
is therefore unwilling to voluntarily refrain from asking questions
without a good faith basis, the prosecutor can object to the nature of the
questioning.297 However, prosecutors (like all attorneys) are ethically
prohibited from making objections without their own good faith belief
that the objection is legally valid.298 While there are certainly factual
scenarios in which a prosecutor might object to defense counsel’s
questions on cross-examination by asserting a lack of good faith basis, in
most situations, the prosecutor, ironically, has no good faith basis for
making such an objection.299 This is because confidential statements
made by a client during the attorney-client interview clearly satisfy the
good faith basis test,300 and the prosecutor has no idea what the client
told his attorney due to the protections afforded by attorney-client
confidentiality and its accompany evidentiary privilege.301 This is also
true because of the criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.302 Therefore, and with the ultimate twist of irony, it is
unethical for the prosecution to object to defense counsel’s lack of a
good faith basis on cross-examination when the prosecution has no good
faith basis to make such an objection.
Further, even if the prosecutor made such objections, defense
counsel could properly claim that the nature of these objections actively
296. See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1308.
297. See supra note 109 (explaining that this objection can be lodged as both an ethical
violation and a standalone rule of evidence).
298. See Blinka, supra note 108, at 34; see also Tanford, supra note 111, at 521–27
(discussing the good faith basis principle).
299. See Tanford, supra note 111, at 501.
300. Id.
301. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (noting
that, with some exceptions not applicable to the current issue, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client”); see also Inbal Hasbani, When the Law
Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 282 (2010) (“Client confidentiality has
both evidentiary and ethical components. The attorney-client privilege, which is the
evidentiary doctrine, is the oldest common law privilege of the various confidential
communications.”). The evidentiary component of attorney-client privilege is found in
Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
302. See supra note 52.
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sought to intrude on the attorney-client privilege.303 Indeed, the
attorney-client privilege shields a client’s confidential statements to an
attorney that relate to the client’s past criminal misconduct.304 While an
assertion of the privilege typically allows a court to require disclosure of
the privileged communication in order to rule on the validity of the
privilege claim, an exception to this rule exists when the privileged
communication between attorney and client implicates the defendant’s
past criminal wrongdoing.305 Therefore, because of the protections
afforded by attorney-client privilege, prosecutors are unable to force
defense counsel to reveal the good faith basis for the questions asked on
cross-examination through the use of an evidentiary objection. As a
result, prosecutors are unable to discover if defense counsel has a good
faith basis for the cross-examination in the first place.
Not surprisingly, when prosecutors do object, asserting the lack of a
good faith basis, to defense counsel’s questions on cross-examination,
research has failed to reveal any case in which the prosecutor alleged
that defense counsel knew a question’s implication was false because he
was told such by his client.306 Rather, when the prosecution objects,
citing defense counsel’s lack of a good faith basis, these objections
usually arise because the questions themselves do not appear to have
much possibility of being supported by what the defendant might have
told his defense attorney in confidence.307 In other words, the
303. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
304. Id. (noting that attorney-client privilege allows clients to “‘make full disclosure to
their attorneys’ of past wrongdoings” (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
305. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.12 (5th
ed. 2012) (“When privilege claims are made, and the purpose of the hearing is to determine
the validity of these claims, the court may require disclosure of the material in order to rule
except when the claim asserts the privilege against self-incrimination.”). It should be noted
that the court may require disclosure of the communication that is subject to the privilege
claim when the party seeking the communication is claiming the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege. Id. § 5.22. The crime fraud exception requires an allegation that the
client sought the services of the attorney with respect to ongoing or future crimes or frauds.
Id. § 5.22. And even when asserting the crime fraud exception to attorney-client privilege,
before a court can require disclosure of requested communications, it is necessary for the
requesting party to make a showing supporting a good faith belief that the crime-fraud
exception applies. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
306. See supra note 109. This research includes an extensive search of annotated ethics
codes, attorney disciplinary hearings, formal ethics opinions, court opinions and numerous
secondary sources including scholarly articles and bar publications.
307. For an example of a scenario in which a prosecutor might object to defense
counsel’s questions because they do not have a good faith basis, see United States v. Taylor,
522 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2008). In Taylor, crack cocaine was seized in a car following a traffic
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prosecution had a good faith basis for believing the defense attorney’s
questions were not supported by a good faith basis. When the theory of
defense could reasonably be supported by something told to the
attorney by his client, prosecutors seem to allow defense attorneys
almost free rein on cross-examination.308
In terms of the false-story closing argument, the rules of trial
practice regulate attorney conduct during closing argument.309 The rules
of trial practice are largely enforced through adversarial objections
made before the trial judge.310 What an attorney may or may not say
during closing argument is grounded in the constitutional right to a fair

stop. Id. at 733. At trial, the passenger in the defendant’s car testified for the government
and told the jury that the defendant indicated he was planning to sell drugs during their trip.
Id. at 735. The defense attorney attempted to cross-examine the passenger concerning
whether the government had quashed state warrants before trial in exchange for her
cooperation. Id. at 736. Defense counsel had learned that the passenger had outstanding
state warrants that had been quashed and suspected that a deal had been made for the
passenger’s testimony. Id. The trial court held a hearing on the issue and the passenger
testified that she did not know why the warrants had been quashed. Id. An investigator also
explained that no promises had been made to quash the warrants. Id. The prosecutor
informed the judge that there was no federal government role in quashing the warrants. Id.
Perhaps the most interesting case in which a defense attorney had to answer for bad faith
cross-examination can be found in the 1945 case of United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1945). In Pugliese, defense counsel attempted numerous times to question a witness
regarding her hospitalization for a mental illness. Id. at 498 & n.1. The court actually allowed
the prosecutor to then question defense counsel about the evidentiary basis for this line of
questioning. Id. at 498–99. However, the court’s reasoning was premised on the notion that
the prosecution “might probe for any that existed, for, if there was any, certainly it was not
privileged.” Id. at 499.
308. See, e.g., Pugliese, 153 F.2d at 498–99.
309. The rules of trial practice are closely related to evidentiary rules, but are
conceptually distinct. See Dale Alan Bruschi, Evidence: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17
NOVA L. REV. 255, 323–24 (1992). While evidentiary rules regulate the admission of
evidence into the trial record itself, the rules of evidence do not technically address an
attorney’s conduct during opening or closing statements. Id. Instead, attorney conduct
during opening and closing statements is governed by the rules of trial practice. See id. The
rules of evidence do not apply to opening and closings statements because at these stages in
the proceedings the trial court is not receiving evidence. Id. Rather, on opening, the
attorneys are only addressing what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial
and at closing the attorneys are only asking the jury to draw inferences based on the evidence
that has, or has not, already been entered. Id. As a result, the majority of objections made
during an opening statement or closing argument are not related to a specific evidentiary rule
or code provision. Id. Instead, what an attorney may or may not say on opening and closing
is regulated by the rules of trial practice, which are grounded in the constitutional right to a
fair trial. See id.
310. Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1308.
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trial, which is largely defined in appellate decisions and enforced by the
trial court.311
As it relates to permissible closing arguments, courts have generally
mandated that defense counsel provide a basic evidentiary foundation
for the inferences he is arguing.312 Arguing without this evidentiary
foundation is considered objectionable.313 However, as explained above,
with respect to the ethical limits of the false-story closing argument,
while the defense attorney knows it to be false, the false story is
nevertheless supported by an evidentiary foundation.314 Frankly, it is
the existence of this foundation that makes the overall theory of defense
compelling in the first place. In this sense, the rules of trial advocacy
provide very little basis upon which opposing counsel can ferret out this
type of ethically inappropriate conduct.315
Further, because of the protections afforded by the doctrine of
attorney-client confidentiality and the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, there appear to be no instances in which defense
attorneys have been brought before disciplinary committees when they
have asked questions on cross-examination or have inappropriately
argued false inferences from true facts when it was revealed that the
defense counsel had knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.316 Only the
defendant and his attorney know that questions may have been asked
without a good faith basis and that an argument may have been
presented to the jury by altering certain words and phrases in an
inappropriate way. And neither of them are talking.
While both defense attorneys and prosecutors are held to the same
ethical standards,317 a defense attorney is unlikely to ever have his

311. See Bruschi, supra note 309, at 323–24; see also J. Alexander Tanford, Closing
Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 108–09 (1986) (“A party who loses at trial
and believes that infractions of closing argument rules contributed to that loss, may appeal.
Theoretically, a party appeals because the trial judge failed to properly enforce the rules of
argument, not because the other attorney broke the rules. The appellate courts are supposed
to decide whether the trial judge ruled correctly on objections and responded appropriately to
errors.” (footnote omitted)).
312. Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part III.A.3.c.
315. See supra notes 309–311 and accompanying text.
316. Once again, this research includes an extensive search of annotated ethics codes,
attorney disciplinary hearings, formal ethics opinions, court opinions and numerous
secondary sources including scholarly articles and bar publications.
317. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
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unethical behavior on cross-examination or closing argument reviewed
by a higher court.318 Due to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the prosecution does not have the availability of appealing
a not guilty verdict. 319 As a result, there is almost no case law discussing
defense attorney misconduct.320
B. The Limits of Reforming Ethical Rules to Prevent Unethical Behavior
Not only are existing ethical rules unable to prevent the use of the
false-story techniques but little can be done in the way of reforming the
rules themselves so that they can more effectively regulate the unethical
means by which honest witnesses are made to look untruthful.
For the reasons extensively detailed in Part III of this Article, there
is little doubt that current ethics rules and standards do prohibit the
unethical false-story techniques. As a result, little could be gained by
amending existing ethics rules to regulate behavior that the rules already
clearly regulate. To that end, it is worth noting once again the
observation of legal ethicists who believe that the root cause of
“professional misbehavior” does not result from lawyers being unaware
of the applicable disciplinary rules or because these rules are too
difficult to understand.321 Instead, lawyers choose to ignore ethical rules
by rationalizing away their dictates to such an extent that some lawyers
are simply “unable to conform their conduct to known standards of
professional behavior.”322
If the ethical rules as currently constructed rely so heavily on selfpolicing and attorneys are unwilling to do so, why not simply change the
law in a way that would allow the competing parties to more effectively
police each other and discover unethical conduct? Undoubtedly,
insurmountable hurdles exist in this regard. It appears highly unlikely
that there would be much support in almost any segment of the legal
community for eliminating the protections afforded by attorney-client
318. See id. at 9 n.6.
319. “Of course, when defense counsel employs tactics which would be reversible error
if used by a prosecutor, the result may be an unreviewable acquittal.” Id. The Fifth
Amendment reads in relevant part, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
320. See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315 (“Unlike prosecutorial misconduct, defense
attorney excess in closing arguments are rarely documented. Because of the absence of
appellate review of improper acquittals, case law almost never discusses defense misconduct.
It is thus much more difficult to find examples of such improprieties.” (footnote omitted)).
321. Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 795.
322. Id.
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privilege, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the
defendant’s Double Jeopardy protections, or for allowing attorneys to
make evidentiary objections without a good faith legal basis.
Society has long ago decided that, similar to the guilty defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination and closing argument, the
values advanced by the attorney-client privilege, the right against selfincrimination, double jeopardy protections, and the rules of evidence
outweigh the fact that in any given instance they allow the truth to be
obscured and the guilty to go free.323 As a result, because of the
importance of these rules of law, it is extremely unlikely that these rules
will be changed so that the defendant’s guilt can be revealed and,
correspondingly, whether defense counsel has employed unethical
tactics in the course of advancing a false defense may be discovered as
well.
After all, if society is willing to accept that those who have engaged
in criminal wrongdoing, even to the point of committing the most
morally reprehensible crimes, may go free in order to protect the
innocent, it would seem society is also willing to accept that criminal
defense attorneys may not be disciplined for subtly altering rhetoric in
such a way as to advance a false a defense through the use of words and
phrases that may cross an ethical line.
In terms of attorney-client privilege, a client’s ability to
communicate confidentially with his attorney, and the related
evidentiary privilege protecting that right, have long been deemed a
“bedrock principle” of our justice system,324 being formally recognized
by the United States Supreme Court over a century ago.325 The value of
attorney-client confidentiality stems from the fact that competent
representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all the facts
of the matter he is handling.”326 “[Because] clients are not likely to give
full, candid, and possibly incriminating or embarrassing facts to their
lawyers unless they are confident that the lawyer will keep the

323. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 341.
324. Andrew S. Bolin, A Troubling Invasion into the Attorney-Client Privilege: Shands
Teaching Hospital and Clinics v. Dannemann Asks the United States Supreme Court to
Consider a Physician’s Right to Counsel in Florida, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2011, at 7, 8
(“The protection of communications between client and lawyer, as embodied in the attorneyclient privilege, is a bedrock principle of our justice system.”).
325. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
326. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981) (quoting MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1979)).
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information confidential,” attorney-client confidentiality has been
deemed an essential means of ensuring the effective assistance of
counsel.327
However, a tension exists between the values advanced by attorneyclient confidentiality and a search for the truth.328 Nevertheless, courts
have acknowledged that this “is the price that society must pay for the
availability of justice to every citizen, which is the value that the
privilege is designed to secure.”329 The “social good derived from the
proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their
clients . . . outweigh[s] the harm that may come from the suppression of
the evidence.”330
As a result, it appears a virtual certainty that the over-century-old
guarantee of confidentiality afforded to attorney-client communications
will not be disturbed in order to determine if the client has confessed to
his attorney and the attorney is therefore knowingly making untrue
statements during closing argument or asking questions without a good
faith basis. Society has determined that the good advanced by
protecting attorney-client confidentiality is outweighed by the fact that
such confidentiality may operate to hide the truth from being
discovered.331
It is also a virtual certainty that there will not be a constitutional
amendment eliminating the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. The right against self-incrimination can be traced back as
far as the twelfth century, and by the seventeenth century, the privilege
against self-incrimination was firmly established in England and the
American colonies.332 The primary purpose of the privilege against self327. Hasbani, supra note 301, at 283–84 (citing In re A John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990)).
328. Id. at 284 (“Despite the benefits of confidentiality, it can produce some friction
with the search for truth.”).
329. In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 70.
330. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1028–29 (Mass. 1985)).
331. There are exceptions to this rule. The most obvious exception is the presentation
of false evidence or allowing the client to commit perjury. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). The crime fraud exception discussed at
greater length in supra note 305 is also an exception. A far less common exception to
attorney-client confidentiality has been adopted in twenty-six states and allows attorneys to
divulge confidential communications that would prevent wrongful incarceration or execution.
See Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 391, 393 (2008).
332. Mary A. Shein, Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege:
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incrimination is to “avoid confronting the witness with the ‘cruel
trilemma’ of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”333 Further, “the
privilege plays an important role in preserving the accusatorial nature of
the American criminal justice system.”334 Preserving the right against
self-incrimination ensures that the state bears the burden of establishing
guilt and helps maintain a fair balance between the power of the state
and the autonomy of the individual.335
The right against selfincrimination is equally applicable to both the guilty and innocent
alike.336 Courts have noted, “[It is] better for an occasional crime to go
unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a
criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced
disclosures by the accused.”337
Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that a right that has been deemed
fundamental since colonial times338 will be changed in such a way as to
allow the government to force the defendant to reveal his guilt, admit
the government’s witness is telling the truth, and consequently expose
the existence of a knowingly false defense.
Further, like the right against self-incrimination, the origins of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution predate the
Constitution itself and can trace its modern origins to seventeenth
century English common law.339 The principle justification for the
Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 507 (1993).
333. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
334. Shein, supra note 332, at 510.
335. Id. (“Accusatorial procedures ensure that the state bears the burden of establishing
guilt and help maintain a ‘fair-state-individual balance.’”).
336. See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The
Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 498 n.4 (1997) (“Unlike the Fourth
Amendment, which serves to protect both the guilty and the innocent from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination primarily
serves to protect the guilty.” (citing Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103
B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)).
337. United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Maffie v.
United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)).
338. Shein, supra note 332, at 507 (“Throughout the colonies the general principle that
individuals should not be compelled to give evidence against themselves emerged as a
fundamental right.”).
339. See William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV.
411, 414 (1993) (“While the origin of double jeopardy protection might be found in early
Roman or canon law, and it may have appeared in embryonic form in England in the
fourteenth century, by the seventeenth century the basic modern rule against double jeopardy
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Double Jeopardy Clause is that “the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.”340 While the focus of the
Double Jeopardy Clause appears to be principally concerned with
protecting the innocent, it nevertheless also serves to protect the guilty
from successive trials and punishment.341
It is highly doubtful that a constitutional provision of such
magnitude, applying with equal force to the guilty as well as to the
innocent, would be so easily cast aside to allow the prosecution the right
to appeal a verdict of not guilty.342 And without this right to appeal, the
prosecution has little ability to have an appellate court review the
conduct of defense counsel.343 Even in the extremely unlikely event that
the prosecution was ever able to appeal an acquittal, there would be
little for the prosecution to protest in terms of how defense counsel
sought to discredit the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing
argument.344 For the reasons previously discussed relating to attorneyclient privilege and the right against self-incrimination, the prosecution
would simply have no idea whether defense counsel employed unethical
forms of cross-examination or closing argument in the first place.345
Lastly, it is unlikely that courts would be willing to embrace evidence
or ethics rules that allow for unrestrained objections in the absence of a
good faith belief that the objection was legally proper. The reason for
this is primarily a pragmatic one: the rules of evidence are in part
designed to control the scope and duration of trials, even if that means

was well established and encompassed within the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict, autrefois attaint (literally, other times acquitted, convicted, or attainted—i.e.,
had one’s goods declared forfeited), and former pardon.” (footnotes omitted)).
340. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
341. Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1815
(1997) (“Here we see how the Double Jeopardy Clause, via the constitutionally guaranteed
plea of autrefois convict, protects even the guilty. But the Clause is more precious for its
protection of the innocent, via the constitutionally grounded plea of autrefois acquit.”).
342. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury is not subject to review by
appeal).
343. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text.
344. See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315.
345. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text.
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that the outcome of a trial is imperfect.346 Additionally, even if a
prosecutor could object to a line of questioning in the absence of a good
faith basis, attorney-client privilege and the constitutional right against
self-incrimination would ensure that such objections would ultimately be
unable to reveal whether defense counsel’s questions were premised on
a good faith basis and whether defense counsel was knowingly stating
untruths to the jury.347
Even more to the point, if we lived in a society where none of the
above legal protections applied, the criminal defendant might also live
in a society where the guilty defendant had no right to any defense at all,
let alone the right to an attorney who discredited the truthful witness
and argued a false defense on their behalf.
In light of the above, ethics rules that define the parameters of how
the truthful witness can be discredited will remain very much dependent
upon attorneys policing themselves, despite this obvious shortcoming.
C. Culture Change as an Alternative Route
This Article has demonstrated that there are both ethical and
unethical types of cross-examinations and closing arguments that can be
used to discredit the truthful witness and advance a false theory of
defense.348 To be fair, this Article has certainly detailed the flaws
associated with the ethical types of cross-examination and closing
arguments that can be used to accomplish this task and how these
techniques are likely to be less effective than their unethical, false
storytelling counterparts.349 Nevertheless, if criminal defense attorneys
wish to cast doubt on the testimony of an honest witness, ethical means
are available to do so. And while these means might not be nearly as
effective as their unethical counterparts, they still allow the criminal
defense attorney to advance a false defense by discrediting the truthful
witness.350
346. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 305, § 1.1.
347. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
348. See supra Part III.A.–B.
349. See supra Part IV.A.
350. While this Article has pointed out that unethical forms of cross-examination and
closing argument are generally more effective than their unethical counterparts, this is not to
suggest that the ethical means of discrediting the truthful witness cannot be persuasive as
well. For example, as pointed out previously, some trial attorneys may prefer the true-facts
cross-examination to the false-story cross-examination as a matter of personal style. Supra
note 256. Further, it is possible for a persuasive closing argument to be crafted by arguing
inferences that can be drawn from true facts while making only true statements. Professors
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However, if contemporary ethics rules cannot adequately prevent
criminal defense attorneys from choosing unethical means to advance a
false defense, what, if anything, can be done to convince them to
voluntarily choose the ethical means of doing so? Perhaps the answer
lies in bringing about a change in the culture of criminal defense
lawyering.
A counter-rationalization to the ones noted above should be
presented to those present and future practicing defense attorneys who
will find themselves in the trenches of America’s criminal courtrooms.
This counter-rationalization should relate to imploring criminal defense
attorneys to recognize the normative value of ethics rules that, in
allowing for the presentment of a false defense while ensuring that the
attorney does not explicitly make untrue statements, represent a fair
balance between the guilty defendant’s constitutional right to force the
state to meet its burden of proof, zealous advocacy, and the defense
attorney’s role as an officer of the court dedicated to the search for the
truth.
How to bring about a change in the culture of criminal defense
lawyering, in which the value of these ethics rules and ultimately the
ethical practice of law are advanced over the objective of winning, is a
question of great importance and worthy of a detailed analysis of its
own. While this Article cannot fully endeavor to answer this question in
the space provided, it is worth exploring a few potential areas of focus.
First, it should be noted that, while attorneys may recognize that
current ethics rules place limits on certain forms of cross-examination
and closing arguments, more focus should be directed at emphasizing
the reasonableness of those limits and the ideals the rules are designed
to promote. As a result, a change in the culture of criminal defense
lawyering must begin in earnest with those segments of the legal
community that not only teach lawyers about the ethical limitations of
discrediting the truthful witnesses but also are in a position to stress that
contemporary ethics rules represent a fair compromise between
competing interests and values.
Ohlbaum and Myers provide two such examples in crafting ethically permissible crossexaminations closing arguments that advance false defenses in the form of misidentification
and consent in a rape case. See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1060–70. Moreover, if
criminal defense attorneys more earnestly endeavored to craft persuasive and ethical crossexaminations and closing arguments they would likely find ways to minimize the
shortcomings associated with lack of narrative structure and the inability to vouch for your
client’s innocence that are associated with ethical forms of trial advocacy.
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In light of this observation, any future discussion relating to this
topic should undoubtedly address the important role of our nation’s law
schools in training future practitioners.351 Legal educators have long
recognized the importance of law schools in training ethical lawyers.352
It is in law school that future lawyers are first exposed to the legal
profession and may take lessons learned regarding the ethical practice of
law directly into their future practice.353
However, courses designed to teach legal ethics infrequently explore
the ideals behind the construction of current ethics rules.354 In this
regard, a criticism of law school ethics courses is that, rather than focus
on the values reflected in ethics rules, these courses tend to be geared
toward teaching students how to pass the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination.355
In the context of discrediting the truthful witness, the ethical practice
of law can best be taught by addressing the advocacy techniques that are
used in the real-world practice of law. In doing so, not only should the
ethical limitations of certain types of cross-examination and closing
argument be defined but also the value of these ethical limitations from
a normative standpoint should be stressed.356
351. Once again, this Article leaves for another day a discussion concerning how best
teach legal ethics and how to structure the law school curriculum in this regard. Legal
educators have advanced numerous opinions relating to this issue and this discussion is a
vibrant one. How best to focus on the ethical parameters of the techniques used to discredit
the truthful witness in the context of teaching legal ethics is a topic that I imagine would be
subject to much debate amongst those teaching professional ethics and trial advocacy. For an
excellent discussion concerning the numerous approaches law schools use in teaching
professional responsibility, see Bruce A. Green, Less Is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in
Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357 (1998).
352. See Edward D. Re, Professionalism for the Legal Profession, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J.
683, 695 (2001–2002) (“Lawyers are usually first introduced to the profession as students in
law school. It is in law school that lawyers first learn rules of law, are introduced to the
practice of law, and the ideals of law as a profession.”); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by
the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 42 (1992) (“The rationale for addressing
professional responsibility issues in some form is to increase students’ awareness, analytic
skills, and ultimately, if indirectly, to influence their future conduct.”).
353. Re, supra note 352, at 695.
354. See Jeffrey A. Maine, Importance of Ethics and Morality in Today’s Legal World,
29 STETSON L. REV. 1073, 1078–79 (2000).
355. Id. at 1078 (noting that law-school ethics courses are often geared to preparing
students to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination).
356. This is not to say that the ethical parameters of the techniques used to argue a false
defense on cross-examination and closing argument are never addressed in law school
courses. For an example, Professors Edward Ohlbaum and Eleanor Myers describe a course
in which the ethics of discrediting the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing
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Moreover, these lessons should be incorporated into professional
responsibility courses, as well as courses which address the issue of
arguing a false defense in the context of trial advocacy357 as the question
of how to ethically make the true look false and the false look true
squarely sits at the intersection of both.358
In addition to America’s law schools, other potential avenues of
exploration in terms of their effect on the culture of criminal defense
lawyering are professional bar associations359 and continuing legal
education courses that are required for practicing lawyers,360 as well as
focusing on those who train criminal defense attorneys specifically at
large institutional public defenders offices.361
It should be acknowledged that stressing the fairness of the ethical
constraints associated with discrediting the truthful witness and arguing
a false defense may not serve to completely counterbalance the reasons

argument are taught through demonstrations of different types of trial advocacy techniques.
See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2.
357. For example, this may include a standalone trial advocacy class or may occur in the
context of a law school clinic where this type of issue may emerge in the course of discussing
trial theory or preparing for trial. Additionally, some institutions coordinate their ethics
course with trial advocacy and evidence courses, as was done at Northwestern University
School of Law. Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 684, 702–03 (1996); see also supra note 351 (noting the vibrant discussion concerning
how best to teach legal ethics in law school).
358. See Green, supra note 351, at 359.
359. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 193, 211–18 (1996) (noting the important role that professional bar associations
play in terms of encouraging and enforcing ethical and professionally responsible behavior by
members of the bar).
360. “During the past quarter-century, most American states have adopted continuing
education requirements for lawyers. . . . In many states, some portion of the continuing legal
education requirements must be devoted to legal ethics.” Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C.
Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 59 (2005) (footnote
omitted).
361. The impact of focusing on those who most directly train criminal defense attorney’s
at large public defenders offices may result in a cultural change with respect to what is
considered ethically acceptable practice within that office. Scholars have noted that the
culture of ethical lawyering that exists in individual prosecutor’s offices can impact the
conduct of prosecutors. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 351–53 (2001). There is little reason to believe that a public defender’s
office would be different. Moreover, while not specific to a culture of ethical lawyering,
numerous commentators have described the effects of the office culture on the behavior of
those working in a particular public defenders office. See Professor Rodney J. Uphoff &
Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal
Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 60
(1998).
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defense attorneys choose unethical trial techniques. However, if
defense attorneys come to see these rules as representing a balance
between important, but often times competing, values, as opposed to
unreasonable constraints placed on defending their clients, they will be
far more likely to follow their dictates.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that while there are both ethical and
unethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument that can be
used to discredit the truthful witness and argue a false defense, criminal
defense attorneys frequently choose the latter.362 The reasons for this
phenomenon range from effective trial advocacy, the culture of criminal
defense lawyering, to the fact that it is almost impossible to get caught.363
Moreover, not only are current ethics rules unable to prevent the use
of these unethical techniques, it is extremely unlikely these rules will
ever be amended in order to more effectively prevent their use.364
As a result, the culture of criminal defense lawyering must change in
such a way that criminal defense lawyers recognize the normative value
of ethics rules that allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited, while
placing reasonable constraints on the types of cross-examinations and
closing arguments that are used to accomplish this task.
By shedding light on how criminal defense attorneys choose to
discredit honest witnesses through unethical means, this Article hopes
to begin a dialogue concerning how our profession can best respond to
this particular reality and ultimately ensure more forthright compliance
with the ethical dictates that govern the practice of law.

362. See supra Parts III.A, III.B., IV.A.
363. See supra Part IV.A.
364. See supra Part IV.B.

